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Interpretation of the Kentucky
Rules of Evidence-What
Happened to the Common Law?
BY ROBERT G. LAWSON*
INTRODUCTION
he Kentucky Rules of Evidence, which became effective on July
1, 1992,1 dramatically transformed the method by which
lawyers and judges address evidence issues. Before the adoption
of the Rules, the law of evidence consisted mostly of a vast collection of
common law rulings, accumulated over two centuries and inaccessible to
lawyers and judges for all practical purposes. In addressing an evidence
issue, participants had to first deal with the problem of "finding" the
law-distilling from a morass of conflicting common law precedents the
ones applicable to the issue at hand, a task regularly producing contention
rather than agreement and, more often than not, a level of uncertainty as to
the correct rule for the problem.'
"Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky and one of the two
principal drafters of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. B.S. 1960, Berea College;
J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky.
'See KY. R. EVID. [hereinafter K.R.E.] 107(b).
2One can only speculate as to the amount of time expended on this task before
the adoption ofthe Rules. The following observation was made before the adoption
of evidence rules for federal courts: "Some United States district judges have
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The Evidence Rules, on the other hand, substitute for this enormous
collection of cases a set of carefully defined provisions that are readily
accessible to all participants and that provide a clear starting point for the
analysis of most evidence issues. In so doing, the Rules have transformed
the task of resolving evidence problems from one of "finding" the law to
one of "interpreting" the law-determining the meaning of a Rule and
extending that meaning to the concrete facts and circumstances of the case.
In making the law more accessible, however, the Rules have exacted the
cost of adding great significance to a host of questions concerning the
proper approach to their interpretation.
More than six years have elapsed since the adoption of the Rules. Until
recently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky had encountered very few cases,
if any, raising fundamental questions concerning interpretation of the
Rules. These questions include the following: Should the Rules be viewed
as statutes or rules of court?3 Are courts bound to construe the Rules in
accordance with their "plain meaning?"I How much, if any, of the common
law of evidence survived adoption of the Rules? Do courts (especially the
Supreme Court of Kentucky) have any power to create new evidence rules
and expand evidentiary doctrine outside the confines of the Rules
themselves? Through five years and nearly one hundred cases involving the
Rules, the Supreme Court of Kentucky resolved specific evidence issues
without confronting such far-reaching questions concerning its interpretive
approach to the Rules. Calendar year 1997 brought this luxury to an end,
as the court addressed the most important of these questions and rendered
its most important evidence decisions since the adoption of the Rules.
estimated that at least fifty percent of their time since they have been on the bench
has been occupied with trying to determine the correct rule of evidence to apply in
a specific situation." Thomas F. Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and
Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30
F.R.D. 79, 99 (1961).
3 This is a particularly pertinent question in Kentucky since the Rules of
Evidence were simultaneously enacted by the General Assembly and adopted by
the supreme court. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text Whether or not
the question is important, however, is a more debatable point.
4 The Supreme Court of Kentucky maintains that it construes and enforces
statutes in accordance with their "plain meaning," unless such construction would
produce an absurd result. See, e.g., Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813, 814
(Ky. 1995); Commonwealth v. Shivley, 814 S.W.2d 572, 573-74 (Ky. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Whitlow, 223 S.W.2d 1003, 1004 (Ky. 1949). Whether or not
the court actually complies with this canon of construction is at least a debatable
issue.
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The purpose of this Article is to focus some attention on the broad
subject of how best to approach the interpretation of Kentucky's Rules of
Evidence. Part I sets the stage for this discussion by providing a description
of two recent supreme court decisions that raise truly far-reaching issues
concerning interpretation of the Rules. Part II digresses from the main
subject in order to provide necessary background about the legislative
history of the Rules-the unusual method by which they were adopted, the
reasons for use of that method, and the extent to which objectives were
achieved. Part III reviews United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, a recognized and accepted
source of guidance for interpretation of the Kentucky Rules. Part IV
reviews varying approaches to interpretation of evidence rules suggested
by legal scholars. Parts V and VI discuss the interpretive approach that
seems to be developing in Kentucky and identifies the crucial issues yet to
be confronted and resolved. Part VII concludes the Article with an
examination of evidence issues that are most likely to generate future
interpretation issues for the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
I. RECENT DECISIONS AND FAR-REACHING ISSUES
A. Stringer v. Commonwealth5
Before the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, Kentucky's common law
included a general prohibition against expert opinion on the ultimate facts of
a case.6 Drafters of the Rules recommended abandoning this prohibition in
favor of the language found in Federal Rule 704,7 which provides that expert
testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact."8 The recommendation was enacted by the
General Assembly in 1990,9 but was deleted from the Rules before their final
approval in 1992,1" clearly because of resistance by the supreme court." As
5 Stringerv. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1374 (1998).
6 See, e.g., Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Ky. 1985);
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Ky. 1984). See also ROBERT
G.LAWSON,THEKENTUCKYEVIDENCELAWHANDBOOK 309-13 (3d ed. 1993), for
a full discussion of the history and application of the rule.
7 See EVIDENCE RULEs STUDY COMM., KENTUCKY RULES OF EVIDENCE 70-71
(Final Draft 1989) [hereinafter STUDY COMM.].
8 FED. R. EvID. 704.
9 See Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, § 52, 1990 Ky. Acts 176, 191.
'
0 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, § 30, 1992 Ky. Acts 921, 936.
" See Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 896-97 (Ky. 1997)
(Sturnbo, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1374 (1998); Newkirk v.
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enacted, the Rules were simply silent with respect to expert opinion on
ultimate facts.'
Stringer was prosecuted for sodomy and sexual abuse of a child who
was enrolled in a day care center owned and operated by his sister. The
child testified at trial that the defendant subjected her to acts of sexual
contact and oral sodomy while transporting her from the day care center to
her home."' A medical examination of the child produced evidence that she
had suffered "tearing in the vaginal area as well as some stretching and
partial destruction of the hymen."' 4 To corroborate the child's version of
events, the prosecution was permitted, over objection, to introduce
testimony from the examining physician that his physical findings were
fully compatible with the events reported by the alleged victim. 5 The
significance of Stringer arises out of the supreme court's opinion on the
admissibility of this latter testimony.
The defendant argued on appeal that the physician's testimony violated
the prohibition against expert opinion on ultimate facts, supporting his
position with case law dated both before and after the adoption of the
Rules. 6 The court accepted the position that the testimony qualified as
expert opinion on an ultimate fact but rejected the argument that such
testimony may not be admitted into evidence. It overruled the prior
decisions cited by the defendant, abandoned the prohibition against expert
opinion on ultimate facts, and brought Kentucky law into line with that of
most, if not all, other jurisdictions. 7
Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690,694 (Ky. 1996) ("[T]here is no ambiguity in our
decision to eliminate the proposed Rule 704 from the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence.").
12 The silence is plainly indicated in the Rules themselves. Kentucky's Rules
have the same numbering system as the Federal Rules. In the provisions on expert
testimony, the numbers run from Rule 701 to 706. In this sequence, however, the
number 704 is not utilized because there is no Kentucky counterpart to the federal
provision on ultimate facts.
13 See Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 885.
14 Id. at 889.
5 See id.
16 See id. (citing Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1993),
overruled by Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 883; Brown v. Commonwealth, 812 S.W.2d
502 (Ky. 1991), overruled by Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 883).
"7 The court described the admissibility requirements for expert opinion as
follows:
Expert opinion evidence is admissible so long as (1) the witness is qualified
to render an opinion on the subject matter, (2) the subject matter satisfies
the requirements of Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (3) the
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Stinger is extremely important for its holding that experts may testify
to opinions on ultimate facts. 8 It is considerably more important, however,
for what it says about the interpretation of the Rules and especially about
their relationship to the common law rules predating their adoption, matters
that undoubtedly created heated debate and division on the court. The
interpretation issue was whetherthe prohibition against opinion on ultimate
facts could be changed by decision of the court rather than by formal
amendment of the Rules of Evidence. The court ruled as follows: "Our
failure to adopt proposed KRE 704 simply left the 'ultimate issue'
unaddressed in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence and, therefore, subject to
common law interpretation by proper application of the rules pertaining to
relevancy, KRE 401, and expert testimony, KRE 702."'1 Two members of
the court protested, concluding in separate opinions that under the guise of
interpretation, the majority had amended the Rules of Evidence in violation
of the requirement that amendments be made by joint action of the supreme
court and General Assembly."
subject matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401, subject
to the balancing of probativeness against prejudice required by KRE 403,
and (4) the opinion will assist the trier of fact per KRE 702.
Id. at 891 (citation omitted).
"8 The merits of this ruling are beyond the scope of discussion in this Article.
The decision is undeniably sound, however. It overrules a position that had been
abandoned by most, if not all, other jurisdictions decades ago and that has been
universally condemned by evidence scholars. See LAWSON, supra note 6, at 310;
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 19-21 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); 4 JACK
B. WEINSTEIN &MARGARETA. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERALEVIDENCE § 704A
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998); 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1920-21 (James H. Chadburn rev., 1978). The supreme
court's prior decisions were confusing and inconsistent, as described in Stringer,
and vividly indicated that the court had been unable to comply with its own broad
prohibition against the admission of expert opinion on ultimate facts. See Stringer,
956 S.W.2d at 889-92. More importantly, the new position does not open the
floodgates to expert opinion on ultimate facts. It merely provides, as the federal
provision says, that expert testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EVID. 704.
19 Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 891-92.
20 See id. at 896 (Lambert, J., concurring) ("Sadly, and despite its protest to the
contrary, the majority in this case has amended the Rules of Evidence by adoption
of Rule 704, contrary to the express provisions of KRE 1102 and 1103."); id. at
897 (Stumbo, J., dissenting) ("In direct violation of KRE 1102, the majority's
opinion does precisely what this Court refused to do when we rejected proposed
1998-99]
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B. Moseley v. Commonwealth2'
Moseley was charged with murdering a woman with whom he was
cohabiting. He admitted causing the death but claimed in defense that the
shooting had been accidental.' The prosecution was permitted to introduce
evidence of several out-of-court statements by the victim recounting
multiple acts of violence by the defendant upon the victim. Upon appeal of
his conviction, Moseley argued that the out-of-court statements had been
admitted in violation of the hearsay rule; in rebuttal, the Commonwealth
argued that the statements were admissible under the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule.' The supreme court reversed the conviction
in a 4-3 decision and remanded for a new trial. It ruled that the victim's
out-of-court statements constituted hearsay that was not admissible under
"any applicable exception to the hearsay rule," 4 a ruling with no special
implications for the Rules of Evidence.
The importance of Moseley to the present discussion rests in a
dissenting opinion that stirs issues about the Rules of Evidence that are no
less fundamental than the ones addressed in Stringer. In an opinion
reflecting the views of three members of the court, Justice Johnstone
conceded in dissent that "the statements admitted against Moseley do not
fall under any of the hearsay exceptions set forth in the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence."'2 He also conceded that "[t]here is no catch-all or residual
hearsay exception in Kentucky,"' at least not in the Rules.27 Yet, he stated
KRE 704.").
21 Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1997).
'
2 Seeid. at 461.23See id. at 462.
24 Id.
6 Id. at 463 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).26 Id. (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
27 The Federal Rules have a "residual exception" that is designed to admit
reliable hearsay otherwise not admissible under specifically stated exceptions. See
FED. R. EVID. 807. In pre-Rules decisions, the supreme court rebuffed all efforts
to have such an exception added to the common law of evidence. See, e.g., Wager
v. Commonwealth, 751 S.W.2d 28,29 (Ky. 1988); Estes v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 421,423 (Ky. 1988); Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 141-42
(Ky. 1985). The drafters recommended a residual exception for the Kentucky
Rules. See STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 92. The recommendation was enacted
into law in 1990, but deleted from the Rules before their final approval in 1992. See
Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, § 59, 1990 Ky. Acts 176, 195-96; Act of Apr. 9,
1992, ch. 324, § 23, 1992 Ky. Acts 921,932-33. The supreme court is undoubtedly
entitled to credit for this outcome.
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for himself and two other justices that the hearsay is admissible nonethe-
less:,"Further, I would find [the victim's] out-of-court statements admissi-
ble under existing Kentucky case law notwithstanding the fact that they do
not fall under any of the established hearsay exceptions. ' 8 Not admissible
under the Rules of Evidence but admissible under the "existing Kentucky
case law," said the dissent, a conclusion made especially remarkable by the
fact that the "existing case law" in this instance predated, and apparently
survived, the codification that produced the Rules.29
C. The Broader Issues
The interpretation issue most explicitly raised by the Moseley dissent
is whether common law precedents survived the adoption of the Rules. In
an article about interpretation of the Federal Rules, one of the principal
players in that reform effort stated that "no common law of evidence
remains" afterthe Rules,30 and the United States Supreme Court has quoted
the statement approvingly.31 Moseley's dissenters obviously disagree. How
and why the particular hearsay law in question survived adoption of the
Rules was not addressed in the opinion. How much of the preexisting
common law remains in effect under the Rules was also not addressed.
How much of this viewpoint might be acceptable to other members of the
court, if any, is unclear, since the majority opinion never really joined
issues with the dissent over the relationship of the Rules and preexisting
common law. The issue is a fundamental one, however, and is sure to
resurface for further consideration by the court.
The interpretation issue most explicitly raised by Stringer is whether
or not the supreme court has a common law power to create new evidence
rules. Commentators strongly disagree over whether such a power survived
8 Moseley, 960 S.W.2d at 464 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
29The dissent cited the following cases as holding that hearsay from a victim
describing prior violence by the defendant is admissible: Smith v. Commonwealth,
904 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1995), and Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414
(Ky. 1985). See Moseley, 960 S.W.2d at 464 (Johnstone, J., dissenting). The
opinion did not discuss the legitimacy of such a rule or its constitutionality under
the Confrontation Clause, although serious doubts exist on both points.
3 0 Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules ofEvidence, 57
NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of
Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LTIG. 129 (1987) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402] (discussing how Federal Rule of
Evidence 402 abolishes all common law evidentiary rules).
31 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
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adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.32 It is argued on the one hand
that the Rules preempt the field in order to achieve "a truly codified body
of Evidence Law."'33 It is argued on the other that the Rules contemplate
growth through "the development of novel evidentiary doctrines ...
preserved in case law precedent." 34 Stringer's answer to the question is
narrow and inconclusive,35 although both the majority and the dissenters
agree that the issue is sure to resurface in other situations.36
Stringer and Moseley both raise an interpretation issue that is more
fundamental and perhaps more importantthan either ofthe issues described
above. How much weight must courts give to the text of a provision when
interpreting the Rules of Evidence? More narrowly stated, the question is
whether the supreme court is bound by "plain meaning" when interpreting
the Rules. The necessity for thoughtful attention to this question is vividly
illustrated by the situations in Moseley and Stringer, although inadequately
addressed in both instances.
The evidence question in Moseley was admissibility of hearsay. The
dissenters conceded that the evidence was not admissible under any of the
hearsay exceptions defined in the Rules but found it admissible under
preexisting common law rules.37 They seem not to have weighed the
following provision of the Rules in their analysis: "Hearsay is not
32 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's
Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 27 IND. L. REV.
267 (1993) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, A BriefDefense]; Glen Weissenberger, Are
the FederalRules ofEvidence a Statute?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1994) [hereinafter
Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules ofEvidence a Statute?].33 Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense, supra note 32, at 293.
31Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules ofEvidence a Statute?, supra note 32,
at 398.
31 Justice Cooper, speaking for the majority, recognized authority in the court
to deal with issues left "unaddressed" in the Rules but used the words "common
law interpretation" to describe what the court proceeded to do in the case. See
Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883,891-92 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1374 (1998). The dissenters expressed no general view on the authority of
the court to create evidence rules through decisional law but concluded in this
instance that the court could act only through proper amendment of the Rules.
36 See Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 892 ("We note that the rules, as adopted, also left
open other issues, e.g., the 'habit' rule (proposedKRE 406) and the'eavesdropper'
rule (proposed KRE 502); and that still other evidence issues, e.g., bias of a
witness, are not specifically addressed in the rules ....").37SeeMoseleyv. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d460,464 (Ky. 1997) (Johnstone,
J., dissenting).
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admissible except as provided by these rules or by rules of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky."38 The words "these rules" obviously mean the Rules
of Evidence; the words "rules of the Supreme Court" most likely mean
rules formally promulgated by the court.39 The words "case law" are
missing from the exceptions list. This omission creates a real challenge for
interpreters who seek to admit hearsay under preexisting common law
rulings. The position of Moseley's dissenters becomes considerably more
difficult to justify if the text of the Rules means very much in their
interpretation.
The evidence question in Stinger was admissibility of expert opinion
on ultimate facts. While the preexisting law prohibited such testimony, the
Rules contain no prohibition on the subject. Did the preexisting law and the
prohibition against such opinion survive adoption of the Rules? A pivotal
provision of the Rules that seemed to play no role in the analysis of either
the majority or the dissenting opinions reads as follows: "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitutions
of the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by Acts of the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by these rules, or
by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court ofKentucky." The evidence
in Stringer was relevant. The text of this provision calls for admission of
such evidence absent an exclusionary rule in one of the following
places-constitution, statute, evidence rules, or court rules. It contains no
mention of exclusion on the basis of case law (preexisting or otherwise)
and thus leaves no room for exclusion in Stringer, if interpretation of the
Rules is governed by their "plain meaning."
This interpretation issue-the weight to be accorded the text of the
Rules-will ultimately have to be more clearly resolved by the court. As
discussed in Part VII below, there is a lengthy list of evidence issues that
are highly likely to produce Stringer-like interpretation issues for the court.
In these situations and others not so foreseeable, admissibility of evidence
will depend upon the extent to which the court adheres to, or ignores, the
"plain meaning" of provisions of the Rules of Evidence. As a prelude to
discussion of this and the other issues described above, it is necessary to
38K.R.E. 802.
39The following statement suggests that the drafters of the proposed rules had
these interpretations in mind for the provision: "It recognizes that hearsay is
admissible under exceptions defined in these rules (namely Rules 803 and 804) as
well as other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court (e.g., Civil Rule 32)."
STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 80.
40 K.R.E. 402.
1998-991
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provide some background concerning the methods by which the Rules
came into existence.
II. ENACTMENT OF THE RULES
41
A. Preliminary Stages
An "Evidence Rules Study Committee" was appointed in 1987 to begin
work on an evidence code for Kentucky's court system.42 Its membership
included experienced trial lawyers from various practice groups, trial and
appellate judges, members of the legislature, and law professors4 The
Study Committee was given no formal charge upon its appointment but
generally understood that its task was to prepare a set of proposed rules for
submission to the supreme court; it began its assignment without consider-
ation of the advisability of codification in this area of the law.'
The objectives of the Study Committee were partially defined by the
condition of the existing law. The law before the Rules consisted of a
mixture of statutes and common law precedents, with substantially more
of the latter than the former. The common law portion was so complex,
voluminous, and inaccessible that practitioners acted more on instinct than
principle in dealing with evidence issues, and few judges could have
entertained realistic expectations of mastering more than a small part of the
law of evidence. Uncertainty in the law led to unpredictability of what a
judge might do with evidence issues in a given case andto disparities in the
resolution of such issues from one trial court to another. Reduction of this
common law mass to a simpler, more accessible body of rules was first and
foremost among the objectives of the Study Committee.
41 Unfortunately, not much of the history surrounding adoption of the Rules is
documented. The author of this article served as the chair of the study committee
described below and was one of the two principal drafters of the Rules. Some of
what is described below is recorded in letters and memoranda in his files, while
some is based on personal recollection.
42 The Study Committee was appointed under the authority of the Kentucky Bar
Association with the blessing of the Kentucky Supreme Court. In fact, the very first
request for this author to participate in the rules project came from the chiefjustice
of the court.
43See STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at v.
4 The advisability of codification was never debated. Practitioners were
pushing hard for codification, probably because of positive experiences with the
Federal Rules, which were more than 10 years old by this time. The supreme court
was supportive of codification, but not unanimously.
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Two early decisions made by the Study Committee further defined its
objectives. It decided "to strive for uniformity with the Federal Rules of
Evidence and to propose a departure from the Federal Rules only for good
reason,"45 seeking through this approach even greater predictability for
evidence decisions.' In addition, it decided that a complete and coherent
code of evidence could not be achieved without undertaking reform of the
statutory portion of the existing law.47 The first decision made it much
easier to prepare rules for submission to the supreme court while the
second complicated the enactment process by requiring official action by
both the supreme court and General Assembly.
The Study-Committee began drafting its proposals in early fall 1987
and concluded the first phase of its work in early summer 1989. An initial
draft of its proposals was transmitted to the supreme court on June 28,
1989.11 The Study Committee met with the court on multiple occasions,
received comments and suggestions on the initial draft, modified the
original proposals as suggested by the court, and in November 1989,
published its final draft of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.49 The final
draft included a drafter's commentary on each proposal, similar to the
Advisory Committee Notes that had proved to be so helpful in the
application of the Federal Rules.5" It was transmitted to the court, given to
45 STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 1.
' See id. ("The Federal Rules have been in operation since 1975; several states
have adopted Rules patterned after the Federal Rules. As a result, there is a
substantial and growing body of case law construing these Rules, case law which
can be of invaluable assistance in the application of a new set of evidence rules for
Kentucky.").
4 Statutes affecting admissibility of evidence numbered above 50 before
adoption of the Rules. Provisions existed on business and public records, testimony
from a former trial, reputation and prior acts of a rape victim, hearsay from victims
of child sex abuse, testimonial privileges of several kinds, statements and acts by
persons dead at the time of trial, and other important subjects.
4 See Letter from Robert G. Lawson to Robert F. Stephens, Chief Justice (June
28, 1989) (on file with author).49 See STUDY COMM., supra note 7.
50 See id. at 1.
Most codes of evidence... contain only broad general rules of evidence
law, leaving the judiciary room to flesh out the general rules through
appellate opinions.... With this in mind, the Study Committee carefully
prepared for each rule a commentary which should be used in application
and construction of that rule.
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members of the General Assembly, and circulated to the bench and bar for
consideration, discussion, and comment. After being favorably receivedby
lawyers and judges, it became the proposal that was formally presented for
enactment into law.
B. Rules or Statutes?
Does the legislature enact evidence rules as statutes, or does the
supreme court adopt them as rules of practice? This question surfaced
early, complicated the efforts of the Study Committee, and endured to the
end as the only serious obstacle to adoption of an acceptable set of rules.
The supreme court was already engulfed in controversy over a similar
separation-of-powers issue51 and thus was especially interested in the
approach to be used for enactment of the Rules. The General Assembly was
expected to develop an equal interest in the subject once asked to repeal or
modify more than fifty statutes to make room for the adoption of an
integrated evidence code.
The approach used to adopt the Federal Rules provided unclear
guidance for drafters of the Kentucky Rules. The Federal Rules had been
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and transmitted to
Congress like other rules of court, with the anticipation that they would
take effect on a specified date unless disapproved.5 2 Instead, Congress
enacted a statute deferring the effective date of the Rules until expressly
", The legislature had enacted a statute requiring bifurcated proceedings in the
sentencing of felony offenders. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(1) (Michie
1996). The Supreme Court thought that the legislation impinged on its rulemaking
authority but sustained its constitutionality by resorting to the concept of"comity,"
a ruling that divided the court and created unusually heated debate over the proper
boundary between legislative and rulemaking authorities. See Boone v.
Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1989); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777
S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989); Huff v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987).
52 See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183 (1973); see also 1 WEINsTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, at xxi ("The
Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Evidence on November 20, 1972, and
transmitted them to Congress on February 5, 1973, to take effect on July 1, 1973,
unless disapproved by Congress within ninety days .... "); Glen Weissenberger,
The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1319-20 (1992) [hereinafter Weissenberger, The Supreme
Court] (discussing whether the Supreme Court possessed the authority to prescribe
rules of evidence).
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enacted into law by Congress.' Both before and after this action, powerful
opinions were expressed on both sides of the authority question.' The
Supreme Court's version of the rules was assigned to a congressional
committee, public hearings were held, revisions were made, and in January
of 1975, the rules were enacted into law by act of Congress.55 Most of what
the Supreme Court adopted and transmitted to Congress survived intact,5 6
but the fact remains that the Federal Rules of Evidence exist as statutes of
Congress and not as rules of practice of the Supreme Court.
The assumption of authority by Congress over the Federal Rules has
been widely accepted .5 A similar assumption of authority by the Kentucky
53See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
For example, in dissenting from the Supreme Court's transmittal of the Rules
to Congress, Justice William 0. Douglas wrote "that fashioning rules of evidence
is a task for the legislature, not for the judiciary." Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1973). Judge Albert Mars, who
had played a prominent role in formulating the rules as chairman of the Standing
Committee of the Conference on Rules of Practice and Procedure; testified before
Congress that "the Advisory Committee which prepared the rules, and our standing
Committee which reviewed them, all are fully satisfied that rules of evidence are,
by their nature and operation, basically procedural, and, therefore, within the rule-
making power of the Court." Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the
Special Subcomm. on Reform ofFederal CriminalLaws ofthe House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 76 (1973) (statement of Judge Albert B. Maris).
ChiefJustice Warren Burger, speaking on the matter of congressional intervention,
said that "the rulemaking process is functioning as its designers intended." Rules
ofEvidence (Supplement): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
theHouse Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8,9 (1973) (message from
the Chief Justice).
55See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
56See Weissenberger, The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1320.
While Congress thereafter revised the Supreme Court's version of the Rules
in specific, isolated provisions, it did not reconstruct the design of the
Rules. Its modifications were limited to the revision of the specific text of
discreet [sic] provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the vast
majority of the Supreme Court's version of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
as well as the integrity of the structure of the Rules, were left intact by
Congress when the Rules became effective on January 2, 1975.
Id. (footnote omitted).57 See, e.g., Cleary, supra note 30, at 910 ("The primacy of the Congress with
regard to procedural matters has never been seriously contested."); Weissenberger,
The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1321 ("From the perspective of constitutional
and statutory powers, little doubt exists that Congress possesses the ultimate
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General Assembly would be more suspect. While the United States
Constitution says nothing about judicial rulemaking authority, the
Kentucky Constitution explicitly delegates to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky the authority to "prescribe... rules of practice and procedure for
the Court of Justice.""8 Although ambiguity in the words "practice and
procedure" leave the scope of this rulemaking authority uncertain, 59 most
lawyers and judges would conclude "that the law of evidence is predomi-
nantly procedural."'6 The problem for drafters of evidence rules is that
hardly any thoughtful commentator would conclude that the law of
evidence is exclusively procedural.6" While some rules easily qualify as
"practice and procedure" (e.g., scope of cross-examination, competency of
witnesses, authentication of writings, etc.), others exist for reasons that
have little or nothing to do with an "orderly dispatch ofjudicial business"62
and look at least as much like substance as procedure:
The best example is that of privilege. Opinions of highly respectable
commentators have differed on this subject. The difficulty arises out of
the fact that rules of privilege do not have as their purpose the ascertain-
ment of an objective factual picture to which rules of law may apply.
Quite the contrary, they knowingly sacrifice the truth (or at least possible
sources of it) because it is felt that some other public interest overrides the
need for truth. It must be said, however, that even the law of privilege is
at least half-procedure, for a truth-seeking interest is being weighed
against a truth-obstructing interest to establish the lines we seek.63
Other evidence rules that reflect a public policy override of the "orderly
dispatch of judicial business" include rape shield laws, dead man statutes,
authority in the rule-making process.").
58KY. CONST. § 116.59 As stated by the supreme court: "Inevitably, there is and always will be a gray
area in which a line between the legislative prerogatives of the General Assembly
and the rule-making authority of the courts is not easy to draw." Commonwealth
v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Ky. 1987) (quoting Exparte Auditor of Public
Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Ky. 1980) (emphasis in Reneer omitted)).6
' Green, supra note 2, at 102.
61 See id. at 107; Ronan E. Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in
Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341,346-47 (1959); Charles W. Joiner, Uniform Rules
ofEvidencefor the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429,435 (1957); Thomas Fitzgerald
Green, Jr., To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe
Rules ofEvidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 482,482-84 (1940).62 Joiner, supra note 61, at 435.
63Degnan, supra note 61, at 34647 (footnote omitted).
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and spousal testimony laws, all of which existed as statutes when evidence
law reform began in Kentucky.
The difficulty, then, for reformers of this law was partially political and
partially legal. The supreme court was engulfed in controversy over the
scope of its rulemaking authority, reform and integration of the law of
evidence could not occur without General Assembly participation, and the
division of responsibility between the judiciary and the legislature was
unclear and unsettled. The end product was uncertainty about the approach
to reform rather than the need for reform. The following statement about
evidence reform in a sister state describes the viewpoint of the Study
Committee as it looked for an effective approach to reform in Kentucky:
"All hands agree that the time is ripe for a general housecleaning in the law
of evidence. It will indeed be tragic if the house is not swept because its
inmates are unable to agree on who is to wield the broom."' Success had
been achieved at the federal level by a wielding of the broom in partner-
ship, described by Chief Justice Burger as "a joint enterprise, between
Congress and the Judicial Branch."65 The Study Committee believed that
a similar approach would solve the problems described above and produce
for Kentucky a coherent and integrated code of evidence.
A more complete partnership than existed with respect to the Federal
Rules was contemplated for Kentucky. The Study Committee recognized
that the supreme court had greater interest in evidence rules than the
General Assembly and superior ability to formulate rules needed for an
effective adjudicatory system. It had already submitted the proposed rules
to the court for review and revision; it planned to submit the revised
proposals to the General Assembly for enactment and to conclude the
process with an adoption of the rules by the court under its rulemaking
authority. The principal objectives were a joint enactment of the proposed
rules by the General Assembly and the supreme court, a repeal and/or
modification of all statutes that were incompatible with the proposed rules,
and the adoption of an integrated set of evidence rules satisfying the basic
needs of the adjudicatory system.
C. Enactment
The rules proposed in the Study Committee's final draft were
submitted to the General Assembly and enacted into law in 1990 with few
64Lewis Tyree, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules ofEvidence: The Opinion
Rule, 10 RuTGERS L. REV. 601, 619 (1956).65 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (Supp. 1973) (message from the Chief
Justice).
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modifications.66 The enactment, however, was given a deferred effective
date (July 1, 1992)67 to provide time and opportunity for reconsideration of
the rules in 1992. There was no reason for the supreme court to take action
in response to this enactment and none was taken. The deferred effective
date provided an opportunity for the court to circulate the enacted rules
among the bench and bar for additional comment,68 which resulted in
further modification of the rules informally approved earlier by the court.
The General Assembly subjected the 1990 enactment to greater review
in 1992, conducted public hearings on the rules, adopted the modifications
suggested by the supreme court, revised its earlier enactment in a few
important respects, and put its final seal of approval on the rules with a vast
majority of the proposals of the Study Committee (and the supreme court)
fully intact.69 On May 12, 1992, the supreme court entered an order
adopting "so much of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence as enacted.., by
the General Assembly, as comes within the rule making power of the
Court, pursuant to Ky. Const. § 116."'7° The Kentucky Rules of Evidence
became law upon the entry of this order, jointly approved by the General
Assembly and the supreme court.
The product of this complex process met all of the important objectives
of the reform effort. As planned, it produced Rules that closely paralleled
the Federal Rules of Evidence in structure and content. It codified a vast
body of common law rulings and made the state's evidence law more
accessible to judges and lawyers and thus more susceptible to effective
application. It consolidated case law and statutes into an integrated code
and rested that code in a single location. It emerged from the process
somewhat bruised and battered but provided for the state "an eminently
practical set of [evidence] principles, easily understood and easily applied
in most cases."'"
I. INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL RULES
A. Introduction
Some of the most important judicial consideration of the issues raised
by StringerandMoseley, and clearly the most comprehensive, has occurred
66 See Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, 1990 Ky. Acts 176.
67 See id. § 7, Rule 107(2), 1990 Ky. Acts at 178.
6 The proposed rules were circulated to members of the bench and bar and, at
the direction of the supreme court, discussed and debated at both the 1990 and
1991 conventions of the Kentucky Bar Association.69 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, 1992 Ky. Acts 921.
0 Order, Supreme Court of Kentucky, May 12, 1992.
71WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, at xxii.
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in the construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the United States
Supreme Court. There is exceptional relevance of these cases to the present
discussion because of the substantial similarity between the Federal and
Kentucky Rules, because the Kentucky Supreme Court relies on these cases
when construing the Kentucky Rules, and because the best scholarly
analysis on interpretation of evidence rules focuses on what the United
States Supreme Court has done and said on the subject.
The decisions discussed below were selected for the purpose of
shedding light on the issues suggested by Stringer and Moseley-how much
weight must be accorded the "text" of the Rules of Evidence; to what
extent did preexisting common law survive adoption of the Rules; and does
the supreme court have a common law power to create rules of evidence
outside the confines of the Kentucky Rules? They are describedinthe order
in which they were rendered so that any evolution occurring in the
approach to interpretation of the Rules might be observable.
B. United States v. Abell
Abel was prosecuted for bank robbery, Ehle testified against him after
pleading guilty to the offense, and Mills testified that Ehle had said that he
would falsely implicate Abel in the robbery in order to curry favor with the
government. 3 The prosecution was then permitted to introduce evidence
indicating that Abel and Mills were members of a secret prison gang with
a creed requiring members to lie for each other, obviously for the purpose
of impeaching the testimony of Mills. Abel was convicted, obtained a
reversal in the Ninth Circuit, but lost when the government appealed to the
Supreme Court.74
The evidence question in Abel was admissibility of extrinsic evidence
of bias for impeachment of witnesses. The interpretation issue resulted
from the fact that the Federal Rules (and the Kentucky Rules) contain no
specific provision on impeachment by bias while containing provisions on
impeachment by use of character, criminal convictions, and religious
beliefs and opinions. What happened to the universally accepted common
law rule authorizing the admission of evidence of bias for impeachment?
The Court quoted approvingly the following comment by the Reporter for
the Advisory Committee on the Rules: "In principle, under the Federal
Rules no common law of evidence remains.... In reality, of course, the
' United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
73See id. at 47.
74 See id. at 47-49.
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body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the
somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated
powers."' It found room for impeachment by bias in the general provisions
on relevancy,7 6 believed it unlikely that drafters would have intended to
scuttle impeachment by bias, and referred to preexisting common law in
finding that no error occurred when the defendant's witness was impeached
by use of extrinsic evidence of bias.7"
The significance of Abel with respect to interpretation of the Rules is
debatable. It has been said that the Court relied on pre-Rules cases to
support its decision and thus "superimposed common-law evidence
principles on the Federal Rules of Evidence," 8 but it has also been saidthat
the decision was based entirely on Rule 402 and that the Court's references
to common law precedents were mere "makeweights."79Abel is clear in one
important respect, however. It suggests that the codification that produced
the Federal Rules (and the Kentucky Rules) may have left gaps in the law
that will have to be filled by reliance on pre-Rules precedents, liberal
construction of broad provisions of the Rules,"° or judicial creation of
evidence rules in the traditional common law fashion.
C. Bourjaily v. United States 1
The evidence issue in this case was the admissibility of out-of-court
statements under the Rules' co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule. 2
751d. at 51-52 (quoting Cleary, supra note 30, at 915).
76The Court found evidence of bias relevant under the definition of"relevance"
in Rule 401 and noted that "Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, Act of
Congress, or by applicable rule." Id. at 51.77 See id. at 51-52.
78 Weissenberger, The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1331.79 Imwinkeried, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 284 ("In Abel, there was no
need to resort to any common-law precedent; even if there had not been a single
prior common-law precedent permitting bias impeachment, the Chief Justice's Rule
402 analysis would still be valid.").
" One could argue that Rules 401,402, and 403 are broad enough to resolve all
conceivable evidence issues. The first defines relevance, the second provides that
relevant evidence is admissible, and the third defines general conditions under
which relevant evidence may be excluded.
81 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
2The exception requires "a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
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The dispute was over whether the hearsay itself could be used to prove
prerequisites of the exception, a practice called "bootstrapping." Supreme
Court cases predating adoption of the Rules required independent evidence
of all prerequisites needed for admissibility of evidence (i.e., prohibited
"bootstrapping").83 The interpretation issue was whether or not this
preexisting case law had been trumped by the enactment of Rule 104,
which provides that in determining issues upon which admissibility of
evidence depends, a court "is not bound by the rules of evidence."84
The defendant tried to make something of the fact that neither the
drafters of the Rules nor Congress had manifested an intention to abandon
the "bootstrapping" prohibition. In response, the Court expressed an
approach to interpretation of the Rules that has been described as "overtly
plain meaning jurisprudence":85
Itwouldbe extraordinaryto require legislative historyto confirm the plain
meaning of Rule 104. The Rule on its face allows the trial judge to
consider any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules of privilege.
We think that the Rule is sufficiently clear that to the extent that it is
inconsistent with... Glasser and Nixon, the Rule prevails.8 6
Justice Blackman wrote in dissent that the majority had reached its
conclusion "solely on the basis of its 'plain meaning' approach,"8 which
he described as "an overly rigid interpretive approach."88 If not this (i.e.,
solely plain meaning), the majority clearly made a decision in which great-
if-not-overwhelming weight was accorded to the literal words of the
applicable rule.
D. United States v. Owens89
The decision in Owens was rendered within a year of Bourjaily. The
defendant was tried for a brutal assault on a prison guard who suffered
83 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942).
14 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning... the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court .... In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.").85 Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the FederalRules ofEvidence: A Not-
So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARv. J. ONLEGIS. 3, 11 (1995) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules ofEvidence].86 Boudaily, 483 U.S. at 178-79.
17 Id. at 196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 187-88.
9 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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major memory loss as a result of the assault. The guard identified the
defendant as his assailant in an FBI interview a few weeks after the assault
but at trial was unable to identify the defendant as his assailant, although
he was able to recall that he had identified the defendant in the earlier
interview.90 The trial judge permitted the guard to testify to his earlier
identification even though he admitted during cross-examination that he
recalled nothing of the assault and little of the prior identification.9 ' The
trial judge acted under Rule 80 1(d)(1)(C), which permits the introduction
of out-of-court identifications if the identifier "is subject to cross-examina-
tion concerning the statement."92
Defendant argued on appeal that the evidence was erroneously
admitted because the victim was not "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement" since his memory loss precluded testing and
exploration of the basis for his out-of-court identification. The Ninth
Circuit agreed, ruling the evidence inadmissible for lack of meaningful
cross-examination. 93 The Supreme Court reversed:
It seems to us that the more natural reading of "subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement" includes what was available here.
Ordinarily a witness is regarded as "subject to cross-examination"
when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to
questions .... Rule 801(d)(1)(C), which specifies that the cross-examina-
tion need only "concer[n] the statement," does not on its face require
more.
94
90 See id. at 555-56.
91 The following is the Supreme Court's description of the victim's testimony
on direct and cross:
At trial, Foster recounted his activities just before the attack, and described
feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood on the floor. He testified that
he clearly remembered identifying respondent as his assailant during his
May 5th interview with Mansfield. On cross-examination, he admitted that
he could not remember seeing his assailant. He also admitted that, although
there was evidence that he had received numerous visitors in the hospital,
he was unable to remember any of them except Mansfield, and could not
remember whether any of these visitors had suggested thatTespondent was
the assailant.
Id. at 556.
92 FED. P, EvID. 801(d)(1).
93 See Owens, 484 U.S. at 561.
94Id. at 561-62.
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Commentators vary over how wedded the Court was in this case to the
plain language of the Rule.95 The opinion clearly shows consideration of
the rationale for the provision as well as its legislative history (i.e., more
than "plain meaning"). But, in final analysis, it is difficult to deny that the
controlling factor in the decision was the "natural reading" of the text of the
Rule.
E. Huddleston v. United States"
Huddleston was rendered on the heels of Owens. The defendant was
prosecuted for sale and possession of stolen goods; he defended by
claiming lack of knowledge that the goods were stolen.97 The prosecution
was permitted to introduce evidence of other similar crimes by the
defendant to show knowledge of the stolen nature of the goods.9" The trial
court relied on Rule 404(b), which precludes the use of such evidence to
show criminal predisposition but allows it for proof of other material facts
including knowledge.99 The defendant argued that the evidence should have
been excluded because the prosecution had not proven his guilt of the other
similar crimes. No such requirement was imposed by the Rule, but a
majority of federal courts had ruledthat other crimes evidence couldnot be
admitted without a trial court finding that the defendant had in fact
committed the other crimes. 00 The added requirement had been imposed
"because evidence of other crimes presents unique dangers to a fair
verdict." 0
" See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the
Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx. L. REV. 745, 755-58 (1990) [hereinafter
Jonakait, Plain Meaning]; Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, supra note 85, at 17-20.96 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).97 See id. at 684.
98 See id. at 683.
99 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes... is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident .... ).
100 Some cases required proof by a preponderance of evidence while others
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A minority of cases required only
evidence sufficient for the jury to find guilt of the other crimes. See Huddleston,
485 U.S. at 685 n.2.
101 Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 753.
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The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled the evidence admissible
without a finding of guilt by the trial court."0 2 Its explanation was loaded
with "plain meaning" references:
We reject petitioner's position, for it is inconsistent with the structure
of the Rules of Evidence and with the plain language of Rule 404(b)....
The text [of this Rule] contains no intimation... that any preliminary
showing is necessary before such evidence may be introduced for aproper
purpose....
Petitioner's reading of Rule 404(b) as mandating a preliminary
finding by the trial court that the act in question occurred... superim-
poses a level of judicial oversight that is nowhere apparent from the
language of that provision .... 103
The Court explained that its ruling was supported by the structure of the
Rules and by legislative history, indicating less than blind adherence to the
plain language of the Rule' °4 but not enough to keep the decision from
being described as a "mechanical application of the Rule's literal
language.' °5
F. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.'06
In this case, which was decided shortly after Bouraily, Owens, and
Huddleston, the Court rendered a decision reflecting lesser commitment to
a plain meaning approach to the Rules. It involved a products liability
action by a prison inmate who had been injured on work release while
using a machine manufactured by the defendant.' 7 The plaintiff was
02he Court ruled that since evidence of other crimes is not relevant unless the
defendant committed the act, the trial court must employ Rule 104(b) on
"conditional relevance" and limit admissibility to situations in which "the jury can
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor."
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
103 Id. at 687-88.
'04 See Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules ofEvidence, supra note
85, at 23 ("Thus, the Court once again was able to justify a pro-prosecution result
partly by relying on plain meaning. Nevertheless, it also relied, as in other leading
plain-meaning cases, on legislative history and sound policy. These inquiries belie
a straight-forward concern with plain meaning.").
'
05 Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 755.
o6 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
'
07 See id. at 506.
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impeached by the introduction of prior felony convictions after the
trial court had rejected his request for exclusion on grounds ofprejudice.10 8
As it then read, Rule 609 left no room for the exclusion of such evidence
at the discretion of the judge absent a finding that probativeness was
outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. After a jury verdict for the
defendant and an appeal on the ground that the admission of his prior
convictions constituted reversible error, the Supreme Court had to decide
if it would construe the Rule in accordance with its literal language and
allow a court to exclude felony convictions of a civil defendant but not a
civil plaintiff.
The language of the Rule was clear, but it produced an irrational and
unfair result and, for that reason, was more than the Supreme Court could
accept:
No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept
an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to
impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant....
Evidence that a litigant or his witness is aconvicted felon tends to shift a
jury's focus from the worthiness of the litigant's position to the moral
worth of the litigant himself. It is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff-but
not a civil defendant-should be subjected to this risk. Thus we agree...
that as far as civil trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(1) "can't mean what
it says."'1°
The Court used the word "ambiguity" to describe the Rule, looked
at legislative history surrounding its adoption, and concluded that it
was "meant to authorize a judge to weigh prejudice against no one other
than a criminal defendant.""l 0 Justice Scalia, who normally advocates
plain meaning interpretation, concurred on the ground that the Rule,
literally construed, would have produced "an absurd, and perhaps
unconstitutional, result.""' Plain meaning construction has always been
subject to an exception for absurd results."' Green may reflect this and
little more.
1o8 See id.
'1Id. at 510-11 (footnotes omitted).
10 Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"
2 See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,490 (1943); Common-
wealth v. Whitlow, 223 S.W.2d 1003, 1004 (Ky. 1949).
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G. United States v. Salerno 13
Three years after Green, the Supreme Court rendered a decision much
more like its earlier ones. The defendants in Salerno were indicted for
multiple federal crimes arising out of bid rigging on construction
projects. 4 The evidence issue revolved around the admissibility of
testimony given before a grand jury by witnesses who invoked their
privilege against self-incrimination when subpoenaed to testify at trial. The
testimony had been taken under grant of immunity, was favorable to the
position taken by the defendants at trial, and was offered into evidence
under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, which requires,
among other things, a "similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.""' The trial court ruled the evidence
inadmissible, concluding that the similar motive requirement had not been
satisfied."6 The Second Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions
because of error in excluding the grand jury testimony. It agreed that the
similar motive requirement had not been met but ruled the hearsay
admissible nonetheless, holding that this element of the exception "should
'evaporat[e]' when the Government obtains immunized testimony in a
grand jury proceeding from a witness who refuses to testify at trial."'1 7
The Supreme Court was urged "not to read Rule 804(b)(1) in a
'slavishly literal fashion' "11 and to hold that the Rule "does not require a
showing of similar motive in all instances.""' 9 The Court concluded
otherwise and reversed:
We again fail to see how we may create an exception to Rule
804(b)(1).... In this case, the language of Rule 804(b)(1) does not
support the respondents. Indeed, the respondents specifically ask us to
ignore it. NeitherDennis nor anything else that the respondents have cited
provides us with this authority.2
" United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
114 See id. at 318-19.
115 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
116 See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 320 ("The District Court... [stated] that the
'motive of a prosecutor in questioning a witness before the grand jury in the
investigatory stages of a case is far different from the motive of a prosecutor in
conducting the trial."').
1 7 Id. at 320.
"8 Id. at 321.
19 Id. at 322.
120Id. at 324.
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Defendants invited the Court to depart from the Rules of Evidence in order
to maintain adversarial fairness. This, said the Court, would exceed its
authority and its approach to interpretation of the Rules: "[W]e must
enforce the words that [Congress] enacted. 12'
H. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' 2
The plaintiffs sued for damages for birth defects allegedly caused by
a drug manufactured by the defendant and used to combat nausea during
pregnancy.12 The defendants moved for summary judgment after
discovery, claiming that the plaintiffs would not be able to produce
evidence of causation, and supported the motion with evidence that more
than thirty scientific studies had been done on the drug without finding
a causal relationship with birth defects. 24 The plaintiffs responded to the
motion with affidavits from experts who testified that the drug caused
birth defects, supporting this claim with unpublished studies not shown to
have been generally accepted as reliable in a relevant scientific
community. 5
The trial court ruled the testimony inadmissible and granted summary
judgment to the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiffs had not satisfied
the "general scientific acceptance" requirement enunciated in thepre-Rules
case of Frye v. United States.'26 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a sharp division in lower courts
over whether the common law general scientific acceptance requirement
had survived adoption of the Rules, a division undoubtedly caused in part
by the absence of any mention of the requirement in either the Rules or the
,
21 Id. at 322.
" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
1 See id. at 582.
,2 See id.
' The affidavit testimony of the plaintiffs' experts was based on the following
data: (a) in vitro (test tube) studies showing a link between the drug and tissue
malformations; (b) in vivo (animal) studies showing the same; (c) pharmacological
studies of the chemical structure of the drug and its comparison with substances
known to cause birth defects; and (d) recalculations of published epidemiological
data. None of this data had been published or subjected to peer review. See id. at
583-84.
126 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Advisory Committee Notes.127 The Court held that the Frye requirement
had not survived adoption of the Rules and reversed. 2 1
The Court spoke about its general approach to interpretation of the
Rules: "We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence
as we would any statute."'129 Again showing its tendency to adhere to the
text of the Rules, the Court noted that the expert testimony rule (Rule 702)
says nothing about a "general scientific acceptance" requirement. It
focused on Rule 402,130 described it as "the baseline" of the Rules, 31 and
ruled that the Frye requirement would be incompatible with the Rules.
The Court also spoke about the relationship between the common law
and the Rules. It again quoted the "no common law of evidence remains"
statement by the Rules Advisory Committee Reporter,"' said that the
"Rules occupy the field" and that the common law serves "as an aid to their
application,"'33 and provided added explanation for its earlier decisions in
Abel and Bouraily:
We found the common-law precept at issue in the Abel case entirely
consistent with Rule 402's general requirement of admissibility, and
considered it unlikely that the drafters had intended to change the rule. In
Bourjaily, the Court was unable to find a particular common-law doctrine
in the Rules, and so held it superseded. 3 4
127 Some commentators viewed the silence as a rejection of the Frye re-
quirement. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 702-36 (lst ed. 1991); 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 86-90 (1978). Others viewed
the silence as an acceptance of the pre-Rules requirement. See 1 DAVID W.
LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHERB. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 818 (1st ed. 1977 &
Supp. 1989); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERALRULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 452 (3d ed. 1982).
2 The substantive rulings in this case on the admissibility of expert testimony
grounded in science are as significant as any ruling ever rendered under the Federal
Rules, but they have limited importance to a discussion of the Supreme Court's
approach to interpretation of the Rules and need not be described in detail.
129 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
'
30 As stated earlier, this Rule calls for admission of relevant evidence unless
explicitly excluded by the constitution, a statute, an evidence rule, or a rule of
court. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
"' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
132 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
m Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88.
'4Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
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The Court found in Daubert an applicable rule (Rule 702), silence in that
provision with respect to Frye, and nothing in the Rules as a whole or their
drafting history to suggest intention to assimilate the "general scientific
acceptance" requirement into the Rules. As in Bourjaily, the common law
rule was superseded by the adoption of the Rules.
L Williamson v. United States135
Harris was stopped on a public highway and found in possession of
cocaine-nineteen kilograms in two suitcases in the trunk of his rented car.
He told police authorities he was delivering the drugs to Williamson but
refused to permit his statement to be recorded on tape or in writing. 36
Williamson was prosecuted for drug offenses as a result of Harris's
accusation. Harris was granted immunity and ordered to testify, was held
in contempt of court when he refused, but persisted in his refusal to testify
at trial. ' 37 The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce Harris's oral
statement to the police into evidence-applying the hearsay exception for
statements against interest as defined in Rule 804(b)(3)-and Williamson
was convicted.Y8 He appealed and ultimately reached the Supreme Court
with his argument that admission of the hearsay violated the terms of Rule
804(b)(3).
The interpretation issue in Williamson was whether a statement
inculpating the declarant (its "self-inculpatory" part) and another person
(its "non-self-inculpatory" part) qualifies for admission against the second
person under the following language of the Rule: "A statement which...
so far tended to subject the declarant to ... criminal liability... that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true."'139 In a splintered decision, the
Court held that the Rule extends only to self-inculpatory parts of such
a statement and "does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is
generally self-inculpatory." 14  Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor looked first to the text of the provision ("we must first deter-
'3 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
'
36 See id. at 597.
137 See id.
"I See id. at 597-98.
139 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
140 Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01.
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mine what the Rule means by 'statement' ,,141) and then to the principle
underlying the Rule when the text fails to resolve the issue." It is proper,
she implied, to look to the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the
Rules for guidance, but not when "the policy expressed in the Rule's text
points clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever force the
Notes may have.""4
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority
that only self-inculpatory parts of a statement like that of Harris can be
admitted under the hearsay exception. He saw more ambiguity in the text
of the Rule than the majority, less guidance in underlying policy, clearer
direction in the Advisory Committee Note on this Rule, and an approach
to interpretation of the Rules that included a clearer role for the Advisory
Committee Notes:
When as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not answer a question
that must be answered in order to apply the Rule, and when the Advisory
Committee's Note does answer the question, ourpractice indicates thatwe
should pay attention to the Advisory Committee's Note. We have referred
often to those Notes in interpreting the Rules of Evidence, and I see no
reason to jettison that well-established practice here.'"
. Tome v. United States 14
The following facts generated a prosecution for sexual abuse ofa child:
Tome divorced his wife in 198 8 and won physical custody of his four-year-
old daughter. He successfully resisted efforts to have this custody changed
in 1989, although custody was awarded to the mother for the summer of
1990. 1' Duringthis summerperiod, the child disclosed sexual abusebyher
father, first telling her mother and babysitter, and then telling a social
141 Id. at 599.
42 The Rule, Justice O'Connor says, is based on the notion that reasonable
people tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they are believed to be
true, a principle that does not, she says, extend to non-self-inculpatory parts of a
statement. See id.
143 Id. at 602.
144 Id. at 614-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
146 See id. at 153.
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worker and three pediatricians. The mother reported the allegations to
police authorities and physical examinations confirmed that the child had
been subjected to vaginal penetrations. 47 Tome denied the charges and
claimed that the child had concocted the allegations to avoid a return of
custody to him. 148
The child testified on direct examination that the sexual acts were
committed. The defense engaged in cross-examination, implying that her
testimony was a fabrication "motivated by a desire to live with her
mother."'49 The prosecution offered into evidence the out-of-court
statements made by the child to her mother, babysitter, social worker, and
physicians. The trial court ruled the hearsay admissible under Rule
801 (d)(1)(B), which permits the introduction ofprior consistent statements
offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive. 5' This overruled a defense objection that such statements are not
admissible if made after a witness's motive to lie arose. Tome appealed his
conviction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed, construing Rule 801 (d)(1)(B) as applicable only to
prior consistent statements made before the alleged motive to fabricate
arose (i.e., as having a "premotive requirement").
The text of the Rule says nothing of a premotive requirement (like
Bouraily andDaubert). "Plain meaning" interpretation might have seemed
to require a conclusion that postmotive statements are also admissible.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, looked to other sources of
interpretation to find a premotive requirement in the Rule. It is significant,
he said, that the "language of the Rule bears close similarity to the
language used in many of the common-law cases that describe the
premotive requirement."'' It is important, he said, that the premotive
requirement is confirmed upon examination of the content of the Advisory
Committee Notes:
We have relied on those well-considered Notes as a useful guide in
ascertaining the meaning of the Rules.... Where... "Congress did not
amend the Advisory Committee's draft in any way... the Committee's
commentary is particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 d. at 154.
ISO See id.
"' Id. at 159.
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document Congress enacted ..... The Notes are also a respected source
of scholarly commentary.15
2
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia condemned heavy reliance on the
Advisory Committee Notes"' but confirmed that the common law of
evidence has an important role to play in the interpretive approach to the
Rules: "It is well established that 'the body of common law knowledge'
must be 'a source of guidance' in our interpretation of the Rules.' ' "M
K United States v. Mezzanatto 55
The interpretation issue of this case was similar to that of Tome.
Mezzanatto was apprehended with controlled substances in his possession,
was charged with a trafficking offense, and thereafter sought to negotiate
a guilty plea. Before entering negotiations, the prosecutor demanded and
obtained agreement from the defendant that statements made during the
negotiations could be used at trial for purposes of impeachment, should
trial become necessary. 156 During the negotiations, after making incriminat-
ing statements, the defendant made statements known to be false, and the
prosecution terminated the bargaining. Statements made by the defendant
during the plea negotiations were introduced at trial to impeach his
testimony and he was convicted. 57 On appeal of his conviction, he argued
that his statements were admitted in violation of Rule 410, which says, as
he argued, that "any statement made in the course of plea discussions" is
not admissible against a participant in those discussions.'58 The Ninth
Circuit held that this provision precluded enforcement of the
prenegotiations agreement between the defendant and prosecutor and
152 Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
153 See id. at 167-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[T]heNotes are assuredly persuasive scholarly commentaries-ordinarily the
most persuasive-concerning the meaning of the Rules. But they bear no
special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen .... It is the words
of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted-by this Court, or by
Congress .... [T]he Notes cannot, by some power inherent in the
draftsmen, change the meaning that the Rules would otherwise bear.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
..
4 Id. at 168 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15- United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
156 See id. at 198.
117 See id. at 199.
58 FED. R. EVID. 410.
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reversed.15 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth
Circuit, concluding that the defendant could and did waive the exclusionary
protection provided by Rule 410.
The Rule speaks in absolute terms, says nothing of waiver, and would
require exclusion of the evidence if literally construed. 6' The Court found
support for a nonliteral construction in matters of policy' and in the text
of the Rule. 62 More importantly perhaps, it found that literal construction
of the Rule was precluded by the background against which it was enacted:
"Because the plea-statement Rules were enacted against a background
presumption that legal rights generally, and evidentiary provisions
specifically, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement ofthe parties, we
will not interpret Congress' silence as an implicit rejection of
waivability."''
L. Summary and Conclusions
The Court's approach to interpretation of the Rules is not easy to
decipher from its opinions. One writer has said that the interpretations are
"ad hoc" and that the Court "has not used one methodology, but several,
and has not indicated which methodology should be generalized to other
evidentiary disputes."'16 Still, if one keeps in mind that the Court decides
specific issues and does not purport to formulate interpretive strategies for
application in all situations, there is guidance in its decisions for state
courts trying to resolve difficult issues under rules patterned after the
federal model.
See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199.
160 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter stated that "[b]elievers in plain
meaning might be excused for thinking that the text answers the question." Id. at
212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161 The Court considered the policy behind the Rule (promoting settlement of
cases) and found its interpretation supportive of that policy. It also viewed its
construction of the Rule supportive of the system's overriding policy of fostering
the search for truth. See id. at 204-06.
162 After noting that the Rule precludes the use of statements "against" a
defendant but not on behalf of a defendant, the Court stated that the provisions
under discussion "expressly contemplate a degree ofparty control that is consonant
with the background presumption of waivability." Id. at 206.
163 Id. at 203-04.
'6RandolphN. Jonakait, Text, Texts, orAdHoc Determinations: Interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 553 (1996) [hereinafter
Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations].
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The Court says that "[w]e interpret the legislatively enacted Rules of
Evidence as we would any statute"'65 and that "we turn to the 'traditional
tools of statutory construction' ... in order to construe their provisions."'"
It has spoken of adherence to "plain meaning" but has regularly, if not
routinely, considered nontextual sources of interpretation when construing
the Rules-the drafters' Advisory Committee Notes, preexisting common
law rules, structure of the Rules, their impact on the adversarial system, and
relevant evidentiary policies. Although the Court maybe less weddedto the
text of the Rules than it once was,'67 the most important factor in the
interpretation of the Rules continues to be the language of the Rules and the
Court's perception of its plain meaning.
The Court seemed to say in Abel that codification had produced an
incomplete code168 but then said in Daubert that "the Rules occupy the
field."'1 69 It has rendered a variety of interpretations in the face of silence on
an issue-impeachment by bias survived adoption of the Rules without
being mentioned (Abel), the general scientific acceptance requirement did
not survive codification at least partly because of not being mentioned
(Daubert), a "premotive requirement" for prior consistent statements is
embraced by the Rules without mention (Tome), and silence with respect
to waiver of evidentiary protections will not be interpreted as "an implicit
rejection of waivability" (Mezzanatto). Recent decisions are more
consistent with the suggestion in Abel that the Rules are incomplete than
with the statement in Daubert that they occupy the field, although the issue
remains unsettled and intermingled with questions concerning the
relationship of the Rules to the common law of evidence.
The Court has said that "no common law of evidence remains" after
adoption of the Rules. 170 It has revived preexisting common law rules not
explicitly codified in the Rules, however, by purporting to use them as a
"source of guidance" in interpreting provisions of the Rules.'7 ' It has not
16' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
" Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (citation omitted).
'
67 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories
of Statutory Construction: A "Bottom Up'" Interpretive Approach to the Federal
Rules ofEvidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389 (1996) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Moving
Beyond "Top Down " Grand Theories]; AndrewE. TaslitzInterpretiveMethod and
the Federal Rules ofEvidence: A Callfor a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329 (1995) [hereinafter Taslitz, Interpretive Method].
168 See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984).
169 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
170 Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (quoting Cleary, supra note 30, at 915).
171 See supra text accompanying note 75.
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said unequivocally that courts lack power to create new evidence rules
through the common law process, although its statement in Daubert that
the "Rules occupy the field"'' may have come close. Its decisions have
been read by one writer as creating a distinction between "common law that
is supplemental to and consistent with the Federal Rules, and common law
that is inconsistent with a specific Rule,"" 3 a distinction that recognizes the
survival of some common law rules and the reality that drafters of the
Rules could not have anticipated every evidence issue in the universe.
IV. SCHOLARLY DEBATE AND DISAGREEMENT
A. Introduction
How best to approach interpretation of evidence rules has been heavily
debated by evidence scholars. The debaters have dissected the cases
described above line-by-line, concurring on some important points, but
disagreeing strongly as to the proper overall approach to the interpretation
of rules of evidence. In the course of the debate, they have identified the
important questions, formulated potential interpretive approaches, and
contributed in a variety of ways to a better understanding of problems that
arise with the interpretation of evidence rules. The products of this debate
are particularly insightful and informative in the early stages of formulating
an approach to interpretation of such rules (which is where we are in
Kentucky at this moment) and for that reason are briefly described in this
section of the Article.
B. "Plain Meaning"
Early indications that the Supreme Court would look to "plain
meaning" when interpreting the Federal Rules established "plain meaning"
interpretation as a universal point of embarkation for the formulation of
interpretive approaches for rules of evidence. In its purest form, this
approach would require courts to apply the literal text of a provision,
except in cases of absurd results, and permit them to look for meaning
beyond the text only if the literal language of the rule was first determined
to be ambiguous." Text would control above all else-legislative history,
172 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
173 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
6 (7th ed. 1998).
" See Imwinkelried, MovingBeyond "Top Down" Grand Theories,supra note
167, at 396.
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structure of the rules, common law background, evidentiary policy, etc. A
modified version would permit courts to examine extrinsic materials
(without finding ambiguity) but require enforcement of "literal language
unless the legislative history of a provision explicitly indicates that the
legislators intended another meaning."' 75 It is assumed, under both
versions, that there is inherent meaning in the language of statutes or rules
created by lawmakers and that the interpretation task is merely to discover
(not create) meaning.
The Supreme Court's early interpretations of the Federal Rules
(Bourfaily, Huddleston, Owens, and Green) showed at least what has been
called "an affinity for plain meaning." 176 Rulings tracked the literal
language of the Rules closely and the accompanying explanations sounded
like plain meaning jurisprudence. Although some differences of opinion
surfaced as to whether or not these decisions actually reflected a commit-
ment to plain meaning construction, 77 there was enoughbelief that they did
to arouse opposition to the approach, led primarily by Professors Jonakait 78
and Weissenberger. 17 9
'
75Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 746.
176EdwardR. Becker&Aviva Orenstein, The FederalRules ofEvidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857, 866 (1992).
177 See, e.g., Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 745; Taslitz, Daubert's
Guide to the Federal Rules ofEvidence, supra note 85, at 3.
7I Jonakait clearly saw an embrace of plain meaning in early Supreme Court
interpretations of the Federal Rules: "The Supreme Court has imposed the plain-
meaning standard of statutory construction on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Court has indicated that the plain language of the Rules now controls outcomes
without regard to policy, history, practical operation of the law of evidence, or new
conditions." Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 745. He saw in later cases
a confusing lack of consistency in the Court's approach to the Rules: "[T]he
Court's recent evidence cases only present a confusion picture. Sometimes the text
is absolute, sometimes it is not, and the Court has done little to define when the
words of the Rules will not control future issues." Jonakait, Text, Texts, orAdHoc
Determinations, supra note 164, at 591.
179 Weissenberger's opposition to the early decisions of the Supreme Court
included but was not limited to criticism of plain meaning interpretation of the
Rules. He believed that the Rules were not like statutes and opposed the use of
statutory interpretation principles (such as the plain meaning rule) in their
construction. See Weissenberger, The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1307.
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Critics of plain meaning argue that "words simply do not have plain
meaning."' 80 Jonakait offered far more powerful criticism of plain meaning
interpretation of evidence rules, arguing that it takes away the "evidence
law's dynamic quality," '' diminishes its "capacity for orderly growth,"'8 2
and produces "decisions without any consideration of the wisdom of the
results."'83 Weissenberger argues that evidence rules are designed only to
serve as a general "source of guidance" for trial judges,18 4 that they have "a
level of judicial flexibility that is antithetical to statutory construction
principles [including the plain meaning doctrine],"' 85 and that they "should
be interpreted in a generous fashion."'86 Both argue that plain meaning
construction of evidence rules leaves courts without adequate capacity to
modify evidence practices andthereby stifles necessary development of the
law.187
C. Practical Reasoning
Professor Scallen believes that the Supreme Court has embraced "a
'plain meaning,' textualist approach to interpretation' 88 of the Federal
Rules, has struggled with its approach, and has created "a level of serious
confusion' 8 9 with respect to interpretation of the Rules. She echoes the
common criticisms of plain meaning-i.e., words have no plain meaning,
close adherence to text produces harshresults, decisions ignore evidentiary
policy, and the law loses its dynamic quality.90 She argues that the Federal
Rules were designed to leave trial courts with "guided" discretion over
evidence issues and to permit "growth and change [in evidence law] by the
common law method-by the case-by-case elaboration of doctrine based
180 Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of
Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1746 (1995) [hereinafter Scallen, Classical
Rhetoric].
1 Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 749.
182 Id. at 784.
3 Id. at 785.
'14 Weissenberger, The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1325.
1851 d. at 1326.
86 Weissenberger, Are the FederalRules ofEvidence a Statute?, supra note 32,
at 398.
187 See id. at 402; Jonakait, Plain Meaning, supra note 95, at 784-85.
188 Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 180, at 1759.
89 Id. at 1738.
'
90 See id. at 1747.
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upon consideration of a wide array of data sources."' 91 Professor Scallen
proposes as an alternative to plain meaning interpretation an approach
labeled "practical reasoning."
Scallen's alternative is different from plain meaning in both approach
and philosophy. It would expand the "data sources" that courts could
consider in the interpretation of evidence rules and would recognize a
fundamentally different role for the interpreters of such rules. These
differences are more completely and accurately described by Scallen
herself:
The practical reasoning approach recognizes that... interpretation is a
process of argumentation and persuasion. Under this approach interpreta-
tion becomes a genuine process of "construction": The interpreter uses all
of the possible sources of a legal text's meaning, such as its language, the
language of related texts, evidence of the intentions of the drafters of the
text, the historical context of the text, previous interpretations of the text,
the instrumental aspects of potential interpretations, and the evolution of
the language of the text over time to "construct" the meaning of the text
in a particular situation.19
Under plain meaning doctrine, courts endeavor to find the inherent
meaning of a statute or rule. Under Professor Scallen's alternative, a court
"is not discovering the true or correct interpretation... [but rather] is
constructing the best interpretation possible in a particular context."'193 This
is not to suggest that text counts for nothing under this alternative. Scallen
describes text as "the touchstone"'' 1 (where courts would first look) and
even argues that it "deserves the greatest relative weight when it is
clear." 95 But at the end of the process, "meaning... is created rather than
found."196
'"' Eileen A. Scallen & Andrew E. Taslitz, Reading the Federal Rules of
EvidenceRealistically: A Response to ProfessorImwinkelried, 75 OR. L.REv. 429,
440 (1996).
192 Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules ofEvidence: The Use and
Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1301 (1995)
[hereinafter Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules ofEvidence].
193 Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 180, at 1759.
'94Id. at 1751.
, Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 191, at 440.
196 Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 392.
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D. Politically Realistic Hermeneutics
Professor Taslitz has plain meaning interpretation in mind when he
says that "an 'objective,' mechanical interpretation of statutes is...
impossible."'97 It is fiction, he argues, to assume that the drafters of
evidence rules "fully contemplated the meaning of the words used in the
rules, as applied to specific cases"; 98 instead, they intended only "to create
a system of guided discretion for trial judges, limited appellate review, and
room for case-by-case growth of the law of evidence." 99 Textual analysis,
he argues, "is rarely so straightforward as the term 'plain meaning'
suggests,"' often defeats the drafters' intent, and forecloses a consider-
ation ofperfectly reasonable sources of meaning such as legislative history,
common law precedents, and evidentiary policy. Unlike other plain
meaning critics, Taslitz does not see in Supreme Court interpretations of
the Federal Rules a "single-minded devotion to plain meaning"' or the
inflexibility that would accompany a "primarily text-based approach to
interpreting the Rules." 2' He sees instead an approach that "weighs a wide
variety of sources in addition to text, including committee reports, other
legislative history, and sound policy,"2 3 what he dubs "the core" of an
alternative method of construing evidence rules called"'politically realistic
hermeneutics."' 204
Like Scallen, Taslitz advocates consideration of a wide range of data
sources-text, legislative history, common law roots, broad purposes,
practical limitations, evidentiary policies, structure of the rules, and
others; 5 "even in 'clear' cases, it is important to examine all sources to
ensure that 'plain' meaning does not contravene legislative will."2' Text
is important to determinations of meaning under this approach-"deserves
197 Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the FederalRules ofEvidence, supra note 85, at
6.
198 Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 191, at 439.
'9 Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 167, at 396.20o Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules ofEvidence, supra note 85, at
35. 201Id. at5.
202 Id. at 27.
203 Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 167, at 330.
204 Id.
20 Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the FederalRules ofEvidence, supra note 85, at
77.
206 Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 191, at 440.
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special weight because it is formally enacted into law"2°7-but is consider-
ably less important than under plain meaning interpretation:
[T]he court should seek guidance from the Advisory Committee Notes,
from a special attention to the policies underlying the particular rule, from
a reference to common law antecedents and developments, and from a
sensitivity to the need for rules that allow for case-by-case fine-tuning by
trial judges exercising their sound discretion.... While the text of a rule
may (and should) set the outer boundaries for interpretation, it can be no
more than a starting point.20 8
The interpreter's role under this approach would be as creative as it would
be under "practical reasoning." Meaning would emerge from a mental
engagement of the interpreter with the author of the text. As stated by
Taslitz, the interpreter "creates meaning from the interaction between his
own values, his knowledge of the world, and his understanding of the
speakers' [drafters'] goals as revealedbythe political context in whichthey
spoke." 09 This, he argues, is what the Supreme Court actually does when
interpreting the Federal Rules, although it disguises its approach with
claims of adherence to plain meaning interpretation.210
E. Moderate Textualism
The most comprehensive and compelling analysis of the proper
approachto interpretation of evidence rules has beenproducedbyProfessor
Imwinkelried,211 who argues for an approach called "moderate textual-
ism." After describing "strict textualism" as an approach requiring a
finding of ambiguity as "a condition precedent to considering extrinsic
material,"2 2 Imwinkelried defined moderate textualism in a statement
offered in defense of the Supreme Court's early reliance on plain meaning
interpretation:
207 Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 167, at 394.
2 8 Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
2091d. at 366.
210 See Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules ofEvidence, supra note
85, at 5.21 See Imwinkelried, MovingBeyond "Top Down " Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 389 (summarizing both his work and that of other scholars).
22 Imwinkerhied, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 269-70.
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[T]he Supreme Court has embraced a more moderate version of tex-
tualism; as under the legal process tradition, the Court routinely considers
extrinsic legislative history material. However, the Justices otherwise have
invoked a generally textualist approach to interpretation ... The majority
has said in so many words that the Rules should be interpreted according
to their plain meaning unless a literal construction would result in an
absurd, perhaps unconstitutional, result. In short, the presumption is that
statutory language is to be given its plain meaning. Albeit rebuttable, the
presumption is a strong one, yielding only in extraordinary cases when the
legislative history manifests a very clearly expressed contrary intention.
Hence, under the moderate textualist view, although the judge may
consider extrinsic legislative history material as a matter of course, the
material is only a secondary interpretive aid of far less importance and
entitled to much less weight than the apparent plain meaning of the
statutory text. The text "enjoys preeminence."2 13
It is true, according to Imwinkelried, that the mental gymnastics of
interpretation are complex and clearly extend beyond the mechanical
discovery of intrinsic meaning of text.214 It is also true, he says, that the
Federal Rules of Evidence are "special" statutes, drafted mostly by lawyers
for interpretation by lawyers.215 However, they are statutes and therefore
generally consist of language that was deliberately and carefully chosen by
drafters and that was reviewed under a microscope by the enacting
authority.2 16 In this situation, he argues, "text demands great weight."217
F. Conclusions
There is agreement on significant points. It is accepted that evidence
rules are different from other enactments ("special"21 or "peculiar
213 Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
214 See Imwinkehied, MovingBeyond "Top Down " Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 417 ("Professor Taslitz is also on firm ground when he adds that meaning
emerges from the interplay between the statute writer and reader. The meaning is
constructed from a complex communicative process involving three distinct
components: the statute writer, the intended reader, and their search for common
ground." (footnotes omitted)).
211 See id. at 423.
216 See id. at 419.2171d. at 418.
"' See Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 180, at 1752 (stating the Rules
are "statutes written mostly by and for the use of courts"); Taslitz, Daubert's Guide
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hybrid 219) and that interpretive approach is affected by this uniqueness 320
It is well accepted that courts can look beyond text to other sources of
interpretation and may do so without a finding of ambiguity. Legislative
history, preexisting common law, drafters' purpose, and evidentiary
policies are among the extrinsic aids that may be considered. Additionally,
it is accepted that the drafters' notes accompanying the Federal Rules
(Advisory Committee Notes) are entitledto special weight inthe interpreta-
tion of those Rules?"1 Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Rules
are in accord with these propositions.
The significance of agreement on these points is dwarfed by the
significance of disagreement over the proper role of text in the interpreta-
tion equation:
[]ow much relative weight should the courts accord to the rules' text?
Compared to other sources of meaning, how much does the rules' text
"count"? In the analysis, is the text 'no more than a starting point,' or is
there a strong presumption that text controls-a presumption that yields
only in extraordinary cases?... [S]harp disagreement exists on this
question.t
Some argue that evidence rules were designed to guide rather than restrict
courts and that text serves only to fix "outer boundaries for interpre-
to theFederalRules ofEvidence, supra note 85, at 32 (discussing Weissenberger's
argument that "the Rules are a statute of a special kind"); Weissenberger, Are the
FederalRules ofEvidence a Statute?, supra note 32, at 397 (arguing that the Rules
are "predominantly traceable not to the legislative branch but rather the judicial
branch").
219 See Imwinkelried, MovingBeyond "Top Down" Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 410 (stating that the "circumstances surrounding the creation of the rules
underscores their special character").
220 See id. at 423.
In the case of the Federal Rules, the statutes address a single class of
readers, not the general public. According to Professor Cleary, "[T]he
audience for the Rules of Evidence is a very specialized one of judges and
lawyers.. . ." They constitute a specialized interpretive community with
their own technical conventions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2" See id. at 411; Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, supra
note 192, at 1301.
2 Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 395 (footnotes omitted).
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tation." Imwinkelried argues that codification was intended to provide
code-like evidence rules ("in the same category as the UCC and ERISA"1224)
and that text does not yield to other sources of interpretation except in
extraordinary cases; in other words, "the presumption is that statutory
language is to be given its plain meaning."' The Supreme Court has never
suggested that the Federal Rules serve only to establish the "outer
boundaries" of interpretation; it has often spoken of adherence to plain
meaning interpretation and in most instances has employed an interpretive
approach along the lines suggested by Imwinkelried.
V. INTERPRETiNG THE KENTUCKY RULES
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has rendered more than one hundred
decisions involving the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. It has rendered
rulings on specific issues in most instances without saying much about its
approach to interpretation of the Rules. It has painted a faint picture of its
interpretive approach, however, and has revealed at least some of the
important data sources to which it will look when interpreting the Rules.
It has not used the words "plain meaning" in its opinions but has indicated
in other ways the extent to which it will adhere to the text of the Rules. It
has begun to define the relationship of the Rules to the preexisting common
law but has left the most crucial questions about this relationship unsettled,
as discussed in Part VI below.
B. Extrinsic Sources ofInterpretation
General: Scholars agree that all relevant sources of meaning should
be used in the construction of evidence rules. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky has used a wide assortment of nontextual materials in its
interpretation of Kentucky's Rules and has done so without any suggestion
that consideration of such materials is dependent upon a finding of textual
ambiguity.
Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 167, at 399.
2 Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 418.
' Imwinkehied, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 270.
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Drafters' Commentary: The Rules contain an explicit reference to the
use of commentary in their interpretation.2 6 The commentary to which
reference is made was prepared by the Rules' drafters and submitted to
both the General Assembly and supreme courtL2 7 In its order adopting the
Rules, the court acknowledged the existence of the commentary but
announced that it had "neither adopted nor approved the Commentary." '
The commentary was never officially published because of this event and
has remained hidden from the view of the lawyers and judges who frame
evidence issues for appellate review. It has influenced the court on a few
occasions229 but has not played as much of a role in the interpretation of the
Rules as drafters had anticipated.
Legislative History: As described earlier, the Evidence Rules were
twice enacted into law by the General Assembly, leaving a very clear paper
trail all the way from the drafters' proposals to the Rules finally enacted
into law by order ofthe Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 It is elementary that
interpreters look to legislative history for the meaning of legal text, and it
should come as no surprise that the supreme court would recognize both the
importance of the legislative history described above and the propriety of
employing that history in the interpretation of the Rules? 1 Beyond this
226 See K.R.E. 1104 ("The commentary accompanying the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence may be used as an aid in construing the provisions of the Rules, but shall
not be binding upon the Court of Justice.").
227 See STUDY COMM., supra note 7.
2 Order, Supreme Court of Kentucky, May 12, 1992.
The court cited the study containing the commentary in Slaven v. Common-
wealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 852 n.2 (Ky. 1997), used the commentary to interpret a
provision of the rape shield provision (K.R.E. 412) in Violett v. Commonwealth,
907 S.W.2d 773,776 (Ky. 1995), and seemed to rely on the commentary (without
citing it) in Praterv. Cabinetfor Human Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954,957-60 (Ky.
1997).
230 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, 1992 Ky. Acts 921 (second enactment);
Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, 1990 Ky. Acts 176 (first enactment); STUDY COMM.,
supra note 7 (drafters' proposals).
231 Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1056 (1999), is an illustrative case. In this case, the defendant made an
argument that required construction of K.R.E. 608, a provision of the Rules that
was seriously battered and bruised during the enactment process. The court found
meaning in an obscure provision by examining legislative history that included a
review of the federal rule on the same subject, a provision of the 1990 enactment
of the Kentucky Rules, and the final product that emerged from the 1992
enactment. See id. at 29-30.
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standard use of legislative history, it is clear that some unwritten history
has also played a role in interpretation of the Rules. As described in Part II
above, the court was involved in every facet of the process that produced
the Rules. Justices who participated in that process, who still comprise a
majority, have memories of what they believe the court intended with
respect to individual provisions of the Rules and, on important occasions,
have resorted to these unrecorded memories in interpreting and applying
the Rules."
FederalMaterials: Drafters correctly anticipated that federal materials
would provide "invaluable assistance" to interpreters of the Kentucky
Rules. 3 The Supreme Court of Kentucky, at onetime or another, has relied
upon all of the following in interpreting the Kentucky Rules-the Advisory
Committee Notes that accompany the Federal Rules," 4 comparisons
between federal and state rules on the same subject, 135 and federal decisions
construing provisions that have Kentucky counterparts. 6 More notably
perhaps, the court relied on Tome v. United States 7 in construing the
Kentucky provision on prior consistent statements23u and fully incorporated
2 See, e.g., Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 891-92 (Ky. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1374 (1998); Newkirkv. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690,
694 (Ky. 1996).
3 See STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 1 ("The Federal Rules have been in
operation since 1975; several states have adopted Rules patterned after the Federal
Rules. As a result, there is a substantial and growing body of case law construing
these Rules, case law which can be of invaluable assistance in the application of a
new set of evidence rules for Kentucky.").
2 See Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ky. 1998) (finding
guidance in these Notes in addressing a hearsay issue where there was "a dearth of
case law in this Commonwealth").
5 See, e.g., Thurman v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 888, 893-94 (Ky. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1150 (1999).
36 See Roberts v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Ky. 1995) ("There are no
Kentucky authorities on point. Therefore, we are free to look to federal authorities
for interpretations of the federal counterparts . . . ."); see also Rabovsky v.
Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 10-11 (Ky. 1998) (relying on Hiram Ricker & Sons
v. Students Int'l Mediation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550, 554 (1st Cir. 1974)); Brock v.
Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1997) (relying on an interpretation of
FED. R. EVID. 103(e) to interpret K.R.E. 103(e)); Smith v. Commonwealth, 920
S.W.2d 514, 517 (Ky. 1995) (relying on Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150
(1995)).
237 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
'-s See Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Ky. 1995).
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the landmark Daubert case into state law when construing Kentucky's
provision on expert testimony."
Preexisting Common Law: The court has noted more than once that the
Rules resulted from "codification," 24 a reminder that the drafters "were
working old ground 241 and left behind a substantial "body of common law
knowledge [that] continues to exist... in the somewhat altered form of a
source of guidance"242 for interpretation of the Rules. It is no surprise,
therefore, that the preexisting common law has been more heavily used to
interpret the Rules than all other nontextual sources of interpretation
combined. The court has relied on preexisting precedents when applying
broad provisions of the Rules,243 has looked to the preexisting law for
definition of terms contained in the Rules,244 has used it to resolve
9 See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (Ky. 1995); see
also Stringerv. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883,891 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1374 (1998) (adopting the enumerated requirements of Daubert); Collins v.
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Ky. 1997) (stating that Kentucky has
adopted the Daubert analysis).
240 See, e.g., Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ky. 1997);
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Ky. 1993); Funk v.
Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476,480 (Ky. 1992).
241 Cleary, supra note 30, at 909.
242Id. at 915.
243 For instance, Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1056 (1999), involved K.R.E. 404(b), which excludes evidence
of "other crimes" to prove conformity with characterwhile permitting itto be used
for other purposes. The court relied on pre-Rules decisions in holding that a
defendant's procurement of perjured alibi testimony (for an earlier phase of the
case) could be admitted to prove the defendant's consciousness of his own guilt.
See id. at 29-32. In Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998), the
court construed Rule 901(a), which requires records to be authenticated before
introduction into evidence; the records were blood test results alleged to have been
produced by analysis of the victim's blood. See id. at 7. The question was whether
authentication required proof of "chain of custody" of the blood; the court relied
on preexisting common law decisions in imposing a chain of proof requirement.
See id. at 8-11. Finally, inJarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1998),
the court reached into the preexisting common law for a set of guidelines for
consideration in determining if an out-of-court statement qualifies as an excited
utterance under Rule 803(2). See id. at 471.
2'4 For example, Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1997),
involved K.R.E. 504 which creates a privilege for confidential spousal
communications without defining "communication." In this case, the courtused the
preexisting common law definition of communication in its construction and
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ambiguity in provisions of the Rules, 45 and, in a variety of situations, has
used the preexisting law as background and context for interpretation of the
Rules.2' So far, the court has done so without unraveling much of what is
clearly a complex relationship between the Rules and the preexisting law,
something that must occur before the adjudicatory system can maximize
the benefits of the codification that produced the Rules.
C. Relative Weight of Text
The Supreme Court of Kentucky often speaks of "plain meaning"
construction of statutes247 but has never once used these words with
reference to the Evidence Rules. It has spoken emphatically about literal
text in a few cases248 but has said nothing explicit about the relative weight
oftext in the interpretation equation. One can easily see, upon review ofthe
case law, that text is by far the most important element of the equation,
more important than all extrinsic sources of interpretation combined.
Beyond this conclusion, which is not particularly telling,249 the extent to
application of the Rule. See id. at 851. Additionally, in Brock v. Commonwealth,
947 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1997), the court construed Rule 801A(a)(1) which renders
prior inconsistent statements of a witness admissible. In this case, the court
borrowed from the preexisting law a definition of inconsistency. See id. at 27-28.241 Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996), is illustrative. The
question in this case was whether an offering party can preserve error for review
without an avowal by the witness whose testimony has been excluded. Rule 103(a)
could be read to require avowal by the witness or to allow the record to be made
by avowal of counsel. The court relied on pre-Rules case law to conclude that "[a]
reviewing court must have the words of the witness." Id. at 223.
246 See, e.g., Slaven, 962 S.W.2d at 845 (construing Rule 504 on spousal
privileges in the light of a preexisting statute and common law decisions on a
number of important issues); Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460 (Ky.
1997) (construing the language of the state of mind exception to the hearsay
rule-Rule 803(3)-in light of the landmark case from which it emanated).
27 See, e.g., Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Ky. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Shivley, 814 S.W.2d 572, 573-74 (Ky. 1991).
248 See, e.g., Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466,469 (Ky. 1998) ("The
language of the rule makes clear that time is an important element of the
exception.");Moseley, 960 S.W.2dat462 ("K1RE 803(3), by its very language, only
applies to prove the state of mind of the declarant. ... ").
249 Even strong opponents of plain meaning interpretation of evidence rules
concede that text is more important than other sources of meaning: "It just begs the
question to say that text of a Federal Rule of Evidence deserves primary
importance; of course it does." Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 191, at 442.
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which the court will demand adherence to the literal text of the Rules is yet
to be revealed. Signals are mixed in the various decisions rendered to date.
In an overwhelming percentage of cases, interpretations by the
court have closely tracked the literal language of the Rules.250 The court
has resisted fudging on text when impairment to plain meaning would be
barely noticeable. In Slaven v. Commonwealth,251 for example, it rejected
what would have been an extremely modest expansion of the language
of the hearsay exception for present sense impressions.2 It has also
resisted the temptation to fudge on the language of the Rules when
offered plausible grounds for doing so. In Thurman v. Commonwealth,2 3
for example, it rejected without much consideration an invitation to
disregard the literal language of the hearsay exception for prior
inconsistent statements in order to protect the fundamental values of
the hearsay rule itself.254 But for the cases described in the next para-
250 See, e.g., Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 10-11 (Ky. 1998)
(holding medical records about nonmedical events not admissible since K.R.E.
803(6) requires that such records be made in "the regular practice of that business
activity"); Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 30 (Ky. 1997) (holding that
tape recording can qualify for admission as a past recollection recorded since the
definition of this exception in K.R.E. 803(5) reads "memorandum or record");
Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996) (holding that the
homicide victim's manifestation of fear of the defendant is not covered by K.R.E.
80 1(a)'s definition of hearsay as including "nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion").
251 Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1997).
252 K.R.E. 803(1) limits the exception to statements made "while the declarant
was perceiving the event.., or immediately thereafter." K.R.E. 803(1). The court
ruled against use of the exception in the following situation:
Caudill testified that she talked to Becky again between 10:00 p.m. and
11:00 p.m. and that Becky told her that Appellant had come home and was
passed out. If the statement had been that Appellant was at home and was
passed out, it would have been admissible as a present sense impression.
However, it was inadmissible hearsay to the extent that it related a past
event.
Slaven, 962 S.W.2d at 854.
" Thurman v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1150 (1999).
' K.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) provides for unqualified admissibility of a witness's
prior inconsistent statements. The court was urged to limit admissibility to
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graph, the court's interpretation of the Rules points unerringly to the
conclusion that text is more important than everything else and is more
often than not singularly decisive.
In only two instances has the court interpreted the Rules in contradic-
tion of their plain meaning. In Roberts v. Commonwealth,"' the interpreta-
tion issue was whether Rule 410's exclusion of statements made "in the
course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority" 6
is applicable to statements made to a police officer acting under the express
authority of the prosecuting attorney. Relying on extrinsic sources of
interpretation,2 57 the court ignored the literal text of the Rule and held the
statements inadmissible." In Tamme v. Commonwealth,19 the interpreta-
tion issue arose when the prosecution introduced "other crimes" evidence
under Rule 404(b) without giving pretrial notice of its intention to do so;2"
it was clear that no notice had been given, although such notice is required
by the plain language of K.R.E. 404(c), 11 but it was also clear that the
defendant had actual notice of the "other crimes" evidence and the
likelihood that it would be used at trial.262 Strict adherence to literal text
situations in which the offering party had as a primary objective impeachment of
the witness's testimony in order to protect the values behind the prohibition against
the use of hearsay evidence. See id. at 893-94.
15 Roberts v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1995).
16 K.R.E. 410(4) (emphasis added).
'57 The court found support for its interpretation in two sources-federal cases
construing an identical federal rule and the purpose behind the adoption of an
exclusionary rule for statements resulting from plea bargaining. See Roberts, 896
S.W.2d at 6.
258 See id.
11 Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1056 (1999).260 The evidence used against the defendant showed that he had procured and
used perjured testimony in an earlier trial of this murder prosecution, with the
evidence obviously being used to show consciousness of guilt, which is an
appropriate use of such evidence under Rule 404(b). See id. at 29.
261 "[imt shall give reasonable pretrial notice to the defendant of its intention to
offer such evidence." K.R.E. 404(c).
I The defendant had in fact moved before trial (in limine) to have the evidence
ruled inadmissible under Rule 404(b), which shows the defendant's pretrial notice
of the evidence and the likelihood of its use at trial and perhaps the reason for the
prosecution's failure to give notice. See Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 31-32.
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would have resulted in a finding of error; the court looked beyond text,
considered the purpose behind the Rule,2 63 and found no error to have been
committed.264
How much text counts in the court's interpretation equation, when all
is weighed, is yet unclear. Interpretations have tracked the literal language
of the Rules too closely and too often for text to be viewed as a mere
"starting point." Tamme and Roberts, where text yielded to extrinsic
sources of interpretation, reflect some resistance to "plain meaning"
interpretation, but the circumstances of these cases were sufficiently
unusual and extraordinary to blur the significance of the decisions. A good
opportunity to consider the relative importance of text-with advocates
sharply focused on the issue and outcome hanging in the balance-has not
yet presented itself to the court. Stringer had the ingredients, as discussed
in Part VI below, but the issue failed to materialize as the court's attention
drifted away from the text of the Rules. Because other issues like that of
Stringer await resolution, as described in Part VII, it is only a matter of
time until a clearer picture emerges of the relative weight of text in the
court's interpretive approach to the Rules.
D. Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources 265
Most of the cases construing the Rules reveal bits and pieces of an
interpretive approach-importance of preexisting law, use of legislative
history, relative weight of text, etc. In a few cases, however, the bits and
pieces coalesce to reveal a composite of this approach, best illustrated by
the parental rights termination case of Prater v. Cabinet for Human
Resources. In this case, the trial court permitted the plaintiff (C.H.R.) to
introduce into evidence a "case report" of its own investigation of the
defendant's treatment of his children.21 The report qualified as a "public
record" but was inadmissible under the public records hearsay exception,
as defined in K.R.E. 803(8).267 The defendant argued that it had to be
263 See id. at 31 (" 'The intent of [KRE 404(c)] is to provide the accused with
an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of this evidence through a motion in
limine and to deal with reliability and prejudice at trial."' (quoting LAWSON, supra
note 6, at 106)).
264 See id. at 31-32.
26 Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1997).26 See id. at 956.
267 The record satisfied the general requirements of K.R.E. 803(8) for admission
of public records but was offered into evidence by the agency that made the record
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excluded under this provision of the Rules, while the plaintiff argued that,
although it was a public record, it could be admitted under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule, defined in K.R.E. 803(6).268 Viewed
narrowly, Prater required the court to define the relationship of two
important hearsay exceptions; viewed broadly, it required the court to
define the relationship of all hearsay exceptions to each other. The Rules
define more than thirty hearsay exceptions but say absolutely nothing about
their relationship to each other, a combination which made the issue in
Prater both important and difficult.
In its analysis, the court recognized that the Rules provided no
definitive answer to the issue and that it would have to look to extrinsic
sources of interpretation for resolution of the problem. It considered the
background against which the Rules were enacted, finding in the preexist-
ing law both a public and business records hearsay exception and preexist-
ing case law support for use of the business records exception to admit
public records, 69 including C.H.R. records in parental rights termination
cases.270 The court examined legislative history,271 looked to the federal
and thus was inadmissible under the following exclusionary language of the rule:
The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule:
(B) Investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public
office, or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party;
K.R.E. 803(8).
268 See Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 957. K.R.E. 803(6) is broadly applicable to
records of regularly conducted business activity, with requirements that are
generally designed to assure that the records are reliable enough for use in
litigation; it has no categorical exclusions similar to those contained in K.R.E.
803(8) and relied upon by the defendant in Prater. It defines "business" so that a
public agency would easily qualify--business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit." K.R.E.
803(6).
269 See Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 957 (citing Garner v. Commonwealth, 645
S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1983); O.C.E. v. Department for Human Resources, 638 S.W.2d
282 (Ky. App. 1982)).
270 See id. (citing L.K.M. v. Department for Human Resources, 621 S.W.2d 38
(Ky. App. 1981); Cabinet for Human Resources v. E.S., 730 S.W.2d 929 (Ky.
1987)).
271 It found that the drafters of Kentucky's Rules, departing from the norm, had
used the Uniform Rules of Evidence as the model for Kentucky's public records
exception to the hearsay rule. See id.
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rules for guidance,272 and examined academic treatises on the rules under
consideration;273 it found guidance in the design of the applicable provi-
sions274 and in the evidentiary policies reflected in those provisions.275 Last,
but not by any means least, the court weighed the text of the Rule and
concluded that records not admissible under the public records exception
maybe introducedunderthe business records exception if the requirements
of the latter are fully satisfied. 6
272 In this regard, the court found a more restrictive definition of the public
records exception in the Kentucky Rules: "Thus, while FRE 803(8) is available to
admit investigative reports of public agencies in any civil action, KRE 803(8) is
available to admit such reports only if the agency is not a party or if the report is
offered by another presumably adverse party." Id.
273 See id. (citing ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW
HANDBOOK § 8.80, at 284 (2d ed. 1984)).
274 The focus of the court's attentionwas onK.R.E. 803(8)'s prohibition against
the use of "[i]nvestigative reports prepared by... an agency when offered by it in
a case in which it is a party." K.R.E. 803(8). It would have been easy to view the
provision as a general exclusionary rule against such evidence. The court seems to
have seen in the structure of the hearsay provisions separation and independence
of the individual hearsay exceptions: "Appellant's interpretation overlooks the fact
that KRE 803(8) does not purport to exclude these types of records and reports
from introduction as evidence. The rule merely excludes KRE 803(8) as a vehicle
available for accomplishing their introduction." Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 957.
275 The court saw the policy behind K.R.E. 803(8)'s prohibition against an
agency's use of its own investigative reports as a safeguard against self-serving
hearsay-"prepared by a government agency which intends to use it as evidence in
a case in which that agency is a party." Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 958. It saw in K.R.E.
803(6) a policy of dealing with the same risk through more demanding
prerequisites for admission of the hearsay-(1) a foundation requirement that does
not exist for public records, (2) a showing that the record was made by someone
acting under a business duty, and (3) a showing that it was made at or near the time
of the event recorded. See id. By seeing equivalent safeguards against unreliable
evidence in the two provisions, the court was able to more easily consider treating
the two exceptions as separate and independent means of admitting hearsay.
276 K.R.E. 803(8) defines three instances in which public records may not be
introduced into evidence even if the elements of the public records exception can
be shown to exist. Referring to such records, the text of the provision says that they
"are notwithin this exception to the hearsay rule." K.R.E. 803(8) (emphasis added).
It was with specific reference to this language that the court said that "[tihe rule
merely excludes KRE 803(8) as a vehicle available for accomplishing their
introduction." Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 957.
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The interpretive approach of Prater involved a use of the widest
possible range of extrinsic sources of interpretation-legislative history,
drafters' commentary, federal rules, preexisting common law precedent,
structure/design of the rules, and evidentiary policies. The text of the
applicable rule played a more weighty role than the secondary sources of
meaning and was probably the decisive factor in the decision; since the
secondary sources complemented the text of the rule, there was no reason
for concern over which of the two deserved the greatest weight in the
interpretation equation and no need to decide if literal text ever yields to
extrinsic sources of interpretation. As indicated earlier, the court has yet to
grapple with these far-reaching and fundamental issues.
VI. EViDENCE RULES AND THE COMMON LAW
A. Codification
The Kentucky Rules, as well as the Federal Rules, can properly be
viewed as a codification of preexisting common law principles.277 They
mostly reaffirm preexisting doctrine and were not in any sense crafted from
"whole cloth"; the supreme court has described them as a codification.278
Whether properly characterized as a codification or not, the enactment of
the Rules effectuated a disconnection with the past and a transformation of
the preexisting common law principles from binding precedent to
something having a significantly lesser standing in the law. This transfor-
mation has been described by one scholar as a "body of common law
knowledge continu[ing] to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of
a source of guidance [for interpreting the Rules]."279
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in applying the Rules, has not always
acted as though a transformation of this magnitude occurred upon the
adoption of the Rules. It has occasionally rendered decisions without even
acknowledging the existence of applicable provisions of the Rules, relying
instead on decisions predating the adoption of the Rules. 80 More impor-
277 There was some statutory evidence law that was incorporated into the Rules
and modified, but it was very small in comparison to the preexisting common law
of evidence.
278 See Harrison v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Ky. 1993); see also
Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1992) (describing the Rules
as "codifying our previous decisions on this subject").279 Cleary, supra note 30, at 915.
" See, e.g., Bartv. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 576,579 (Ky. 1997) (holding
that no abuse of discretion had occurred in finding testimonial competency of a
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tantly, it has occasionally adhered to preexisting common law decisions
that clearly conflict with provisions of the Rules. In Slaven v. Common-
wealth,"' the court followed preexisting law at the expense of a new
definition of statements against interest; the preexisting law required the
makers of such statements to know they were speaking against their
interest," 2 while K.R.E. 804(b)(3) "adopts a standard of measurement that
is objective-'a reasonable person in the declarant's position.' ,283 In Funk
v. Commonwealth,8 4 when defining judicial authority to exclude relevant
evidence because of undue prejudice, the court borrowed from preexisting
common law a yardstick that is significantly different from the one
required by the Rules; the preexisting law rested discretion upon a finding
that probativeness outweighed undue prejudice,8 5 while K.R.E. 403 rests
discretion upon a much more demanding finding that undue prejudice
substantially outweighs probativeness.86 The preexisting common law
looked more like precedent than a source of guidance in these cases. But
the court did not in any case focus sharply on the relationship between the
Rules and preexisting common law and seems not to have expressed any
view on whether or not pre-Rules common law doctrine survived the
adoption of the Rules, which brings us back to the Moseley2" 7 dissent.
The question in Moseley was admissibility of hearsay evidence,
excluded by the majority but believed to be admissible by the dissenters
under preexisting common law precedent rather than the Rules. The Rules
contain more than thirty hearsay exceptions-carefully defined, deeply
child witness, relying on a 1977 case for the competency standard rather than the
one defined in K.R.E. 601); Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242,248 (Ky.
1996) (holding that lay opinion on insanity is admissible, citing three cases decided
before adoption of the Rules but not K.R.E. 701, which defines the admissibility
of lay opinion).
' Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1997).282 See id. (citing Fisher v. Duckworth, 738 S.W.2d 810 (Ky. 1987)).
283 LAWSON, supra note 6, at 423.
14 Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1992).
"s See id. at 481 ("[T]he trial court must decide whether the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its inflammatory nature. If it does, the evidence is
admissible. Otherwise it is not." (citing Commonwealth v. Morrison, 661 S.W.2d
471,473 (Ky. 1983))).
116 See K.R.E. 403. In other instances involving this issue, the court has defined
trial court authority under the yardstick contained in K.R.E. 403. See, e.g., Bell v.
Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky. 1994) (discussing the trial court's
determination under K.R.E. 403).
27 Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1997).
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rooted in tradition, and plainly suggesting that drafters of the Rules
exercised what the United States Supreme Court described as "careful
judgment as to what hearsay may come into evidence and what may not."288
Could they have possibly contemplated additional exceptions left preserved
in the preexisting common law? On this point, there is no room for
reasonable doubt, given the content of K.R.E. 802: "Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules or by rules of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky.12 89 There is no indication that the dissenters inMoseley
confronted the plain text of this provision, and no indication that they
carefully considered the serious ramifications of concluding that preexist-
ing common law principles survive adoption of the Rules.219 Adherence to
preexisting doctrine might possibly be necessary and justifiable in areas
where the Rules are incomplete, as discussed below. In areas where the
Rules are comprehensive, with hearsay being perhaps the best example, the
preservation of preexisting principles can serve only to undermine the
codification effort that produced the Rules.
B. New Common Law Rules
Do the Rules retain or abolish the common law power to create new
evidentiary doctrine? Professor Cleary, official Reporter for the Advisory
Committee that drafted the Federal Rules, spoke to the issue shortly after
their adoption: "[U]nder the Federal Rules no common law of evidence
remains."291 Probably no issue has been more heatedly debated than this
one, sparked by seemingly contradictory provisions of the Rules, powerful
arguments on both sides of the question, and the obvious importance of the
issue to the operation and effect of the Rules.
The most compelling case for survival of a common law power to
create new rules is made by Professor Weissenberger, who believes that
support for survival is found in the structure, history, and content of the
Rules. The Rules, he contends, "were designed as general rules with
intentional broad gaps,"2' clearly contemplating that "the broad range of
judicial powers exercised under the common law were intended to be
integral in the operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence."293 Moreover, he
argues, the Kentucky Rules explicitly provide for such power in the
8 United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992).
289 K.R.E. 802.290 See Moseley, 960 S.W.2d at 463-64 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
291 Cleary, supra note 30, at 915.
292Weissenberger, The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1329.
293Id. at 1334.
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following provision: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion ofgrowth and development ofthe law ofevidence to the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 94 Of the
federal counterpart to this rule, he says, "I cannot escape an interpretation
of the phrase 'growth and development of the law of evidence' as one
which authorizes the development of novel evidentiary doctrines. Growth
cannot be achieved but through these evidentiary principles, preserved in
case law precedent." '29
The case against survival of a common law power to create new rules,
at least an unlimited one, is persuasively made by Professor Imwinkelried,
who argues that survival would undermine the primary objective of
codification ("simplification of American evidentiary doctrine" 96) and
"fl[y] in the face of legislative history."2 97 More pointedly, he argues,
survival of the power would violate the plain text of Rule 402, which he
calls "the keystone of the structure of the Federal Rules":29
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, by Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.2
Weissenberger's view is "unsound" and "flawed," he argues, because it
"overlooks the central importance of... Rule 402."' 0 The omission of
"case law" and "common law" from the list of exceptions to its rule on
admissibility was purposeful, he argues, and "deprives the courts of the
power to enforce uncodified exclusionary rules of evidence,"' either
preexisting or newly created. 2
294K.R.E. 102 (emphasis added).
295 Weissenberger, Are the FederalRules ofEvidence a Statute?, supra note 32,
at 398.296 Imwinkelried, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 294.
29 Iwinkelried, Federal Rule ofEvidence 402, supra note 30, at 136-37.
29
' Imwinkelried, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 273.
299 K.R.E. 402.
31 Imwinkelried, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 272.
3011Id.
302 
"First, Rule 402 has a prospective effect: it precludes trial judges from future
creation of new exclusionary rules of general applicability. Second, and more
importantly, the Rule impliedly repeals prior decisional admissibility rules that
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There is no easy choice between the two views. The first adds
flexibility that could lead to better decision making in given instances; the
second assures greater certainty of the law and more predictable rulings on
evidence issues, both of which are important if not crucial to litigants. The
first undermines the objectives of codification, at least to some extent, and
would make selection of the second easier, quite easy in fact, if the
codification that produced the Rules is sufficiently comprehensive to
resolve most of the evidence issues that are likely to arise.
C. Completeness of the Rules
A perfect codification would produce rules that would resolve every
conceivable problem. Kentucky's Rules are very comprehensive in most
areas-hearsay, best evidence, opinion, and authentication; unlike their
federal counterparts, they are even fairly complete in the area of
privileges." 3 They are noticeably incomplete in only one area-testimonial
credibility; they provide for impeachment by felony convictions but in
most other respects are silent on the subject. The Kentucky Rules contain
no rule on impeachment by bias, interest, or corruption, none on impeach-
ment by contradiction, and an inadequate one on the use of character for
credibilitypurposes. 3°4 Undoubtedly, smallergaps exist in otherparts ofthe
Rules, although probably none approaching the magnitude of what exists
in the credibility area. All of these omissions raise the same crucial
question. Do the Rules succumb to the common law for resolution of issues
not explicitly addressed in the Rules?0 5
United States v. Abel3°6 framed this question for consideration by the
United States Supreme Court. In this case, evidence of bias was admitted
to impeach a key defense witness over objection that the silence of the
Federal Rules on this subject meant that impeachment by bias was
impermissible. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Rules "do not
have not been codified." Imwinkelried, FederalRule ofEvidence 402, supra note
30, at 137 (footnotes omitted).
303 Federal Rule 501 explicitly defers to the common law for definitions of
privileges. See FED. R. EVID. 501. Kentucky Rules 501 through 511 provide
substantial coverage of the law of privileges. See K.R.E. 501-511.
304 See K.R.E. 608.
305 Stated differently, the inquiry would have two parts-(l) was there survival
of common law precedent in areas not explicitly addressed by the Rules, and (2)
do courts have a common law power to create new evidence doctrine for such
areas.
306 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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by their terms" deal with impeachment by bias3 °7 but held that evidence of
bias is admissible nonetheless. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
clearly looked to the preexisting common law for guidance, using the
words "state of unanimity"3 8 to describe that law, and wrote an opinion
showing very heavy reliance on pre-Rules decisional law, leaving room for
argument that the Rules do indeed yield to the pre-Rules common law in
some instances.30 9 A different reading of Abel-unsupportive of this
argument-is clearly possible, perhaps even compelling.
In its analysis, the Court plainly looked beyond the pre-Rules common
law for support of its decision, citing in its opinion post-Rules lower court
decisions, multiple treatises, Advisory Committee Notes, and other
authorities. It quoted the famous Cleary statement that "no common law of
evidence remains"310 and clearly grounded its decision in the Rules rather
than the preexisting law: "We think the lesson to be drawn from all of this
is that it is permissible to impeach a witness by showing his bias under the
Federal Rules ofEvidence just as it was permissible to do so before their
adoption."3 ' The Court foundthe evidence admissible underthe most basic
provisions of the Rules-relevant under Rule 401 and admissible under the
broad umbrella of Rule 402: "Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence
is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the United States Constitu-
tion, Act of Congress, or by applicable rule."312
The Rules occupy the whole field, argues Imwinkelried, and the
decision in Abel is confirmation of that:
Evidence of the witness' bias was logically relevant to a fact in dispute.
Logically relevant evidence is presumed admissible under Rules 401-02.
If there is no [explicit] statutory exclusionary rule barring the evidence
.... the evidence is admissible. The Court described that sequence of
analysis in Abel .... When an item of evidence passes the muster of that
3 7 Id. at49.
30 1 Id. at 50.
31 Weissenberger says aboutAbel that "[t]he Court concluded that because the
common law of evidence allowed the showing of bias, the testimony was
admissible." Weissenberger, The Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 1331. Similar
observations have been offered by others: "Some evidence questions simply lie
outside the rules. For example, in United States v. Abel... the Court analyzed and
applied a principle of evidence-impeachment for bias-that is not delineated in the
Rules." Becker & Orenstein, supra note 176, at 866 (footnotes omitted).
310 Abel, 469 U.S. at 51.
31 Id. (emphasis added.)
32Id. at 51.
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sequence of analysis, Rules 401-02 are ample statutory authorization for
the admission of the evidence. A "doctrine of admissibility" does notneed
any statutory sanction other than Rules 401 and 402.3'3
Rule 402's role is huge under this view. It operates as a residual rule of
admission and in the same breath forecloses the exclusion of relevant
evidence except under the authority of explicit rules of exclusion contained
in the Constitution, statutes, court rules, or rules of evidence. It confers a
quality of completeness upon the Rules and makes it feasible to embrace
the view that "no common law of evidence remains," should one be so
inclined.
D. Stringer v. Commonwealth314
Are expert witnesses foreclosed from testifying to opinions on ultimate
facts? Stringer framed this question. Kentucky's Rules are silent on the
subject, whereas the preexisting common law required exclusion;
"legislative history" had produced a widespread belief that the preexisting
law had survived adoption of the Rules.315 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
held that experts may testify to opinions on ultimate facts in an opinion
reflecting serious debate and division over its authority to adopt this
position without a formal amendment to the Rules. All that the court has
said to date on the important issues discussed in this part of the Article is
contained in one paragraph of Stringer.
The court announced its rejection of the ultimate issue rule, summa-
rized the requirements for expert opinion testimony, and then made the
following statements:
Brown v. Commonwealth, supra, andAlexanderv. Commonwealth, supra,
are overruled insofar as they hold otherwise. Our departure from the
"ultimate issue" rule does not contravene KRE 1102 and 1103 [covering
amendment of the Rules]. Our failure to adopt proposed KR.E 704 simply
left the "ultimate issue" unaddressed in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence
and, therefore, subjectto common law interpretation by proper application
313 Imwinkelried, A BriefDefense, supra note 32, at 288 (footnotes omitted).
314 Stringerv. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1374 (1998). See supra Part LA for a full description of this case.
315 As described in Part I above, drafters had recommended a provision that
would have eliminated the prohibition, but it was not included in the final version
of the Rules, at the initiative of the supreme court. See supra notes 6-12 and
accompanying text.
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of the rules pertaining to relevancy, KRE 401, and expert testimony, KRE
702. If we had wished to adopt a rule of evidence precluding any expert
opinion embracing the ultimate issue, it would have been a simple matter
to have done so when we approved the Rules of Evidence and submitted
them to the legislature in 1991. We note that the rules, as adopted, also
left open other issues, e.g., the "habit" rule (proposed KRE 406) and the
"eavesdropper" rule (proposed KRE 502); and that still other evidence
issues, e.g., bias of a witness, are not specifically addressed in the rules,
but are resolved by proper application of other rules, such as KRE 401.316
Does the court imply, by overruling Brown and Alexander (pre-Rules
cases), that preexisting common law rules survived the codification that
produced the Rules? Perhaps, although there is no indication the court gave
this issue much, if any, consideration.3 7 Alternatively, does the decision
imply that the supreme court retains a common law power to superimpose
evidence doctrine on the Rules? Partial dissenters argued that the court had
exercised such a power, in violation of the amendment provisions of the
Rules;318 the majority disagreed and described its decision as nothing more
than a "proper application of the rules pertaining to relevancy, KRE 401,
and expert testimony, KRE 702,"319 keeping its silence with respect to the
broader question of whether there remains after the Rules a common law
power to create evidence doctrine.
The court appears not to have considered the applicability of the
"keystone" provision of the Rules-K.R.E. 402. Had its attention been
drawn to this provision, it would have found added support for its decision
and a more compelling need to address the issues under discussion, as well
as the issue of how much weight to accord the literal text of the Rules. All
relevant evidence is admissible, under K.R.E. 402, unless the United States
Constitution, the Constitution of Kentucky, an act, a court rule, or an
316 Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 891-92.
317 Preexisting common law decisions remain as "sources of guidance" even if
one concludes that "no common law remains after the Rules." See supra text
accompanying note 75. In overruling Brown and Alexander, the court merely
makes it clear that they may no longer be regarded as "sources of guidance" in
applying the opinion provisions of the Rules. The first sentence of the quotation
from Stringer could mean this and nothing more.311 See Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 896 (Lambert, J., and Stephens, C.J., concurring
in result only) ("Sadly, and despite its protests to the contrary, the majority in this
case has amended the Rules of Evidence by adoption of Rule 704, contrary to the
express provisions of KRE 1102 and 1103.").319Id. at 891-92.
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evidence rule provides to the contrary. There was no doubt about relevance
in Stringer and no ground for exclusion except the common law prohibition
against expert opinion on ultimate issues. To have ruled in favor of
exclusion, the court would have been compelled to disregard the text of the
Rule and embrace the idea that common law rules did indeed survive
adoption of the Rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Introduction
The Stringer case and the Moseley dissent raise crucial issues
concerning the relationship of the Rules of Evidence to the preexisting
common law doctrine from which the Rules are derived. Stringer com-
mences discussion of the subject but leaves the most significant questions
unanswered; further discussion by the supreme court is both needed and
inevitable. This Article has strived to advance the discussion by sharpening
the focus of the inquiry, drawing needed attention to overlooked provisions
of the Rules, and examining the results of a federal experience with the
same problems. It now concludes with a description of particular aspects
of the Rules that are most likely to engage the supreme court in further
discussion of the important issues identified and described above.
B. Habit
Kentucky's pre-Rules case law required exclusion of evidence of habit
when offered to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion.320 Probably no other state required exclusion of such evidence
and it is almost a certainty that Kentucky's rule was ignored regularly and
routinely.32' Drafters of Kentucky's Rules recommended a provision
320 See, e.g., Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Hare's Adm'x, 178 S.W.2d 835
(Ky. 1944) (ruling habitual stopping of vehicle before crossing specific railroad
tracks inadmissible), overruled in part by Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1962); Lexington Ry. Co. v. Herring, 96 S.W. 558
(Ky. 1906) (holding habitual boarding of a moving street car inadmissible).
321 It is commonplace for witnesses to have no memory of what they did on a
given occasion with respect to routine matters (e.g., adhering to speed limits,
checking vital signs of a patient, verifying bank statements, giving directions to
technicians, etc.) but to have good and clear memory of what they ordinarily do in
such situations. Most lawyers would not even think of raising questions about the
admissibility of such evidence.
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admitting habit evidence;3" however, the recommendation was deleted
from the Rules before their adoption,3" leaving them silent with respect to
admission or exclusion of such evidence. Because evidence of habit is
clearly probative and often needed in litigation, the significance of this
silence will have to be addressed by the supreme court.
There is an exact duplication of the interpretation problem of Stringer
in this situation-preexisting common law at odds with the overwhelming
weight of authority, rejection of an explicit proposal for change, and no
specific treatment of the subject in the Rules. More importantly, the
uncodified preexisting law is exclusionary in its effect and directly collides
with the plain language of K.R.E. 402. In examining this problem with its
sights on Rule 402, the supreme court would have to speak more directly
than it has to date about the relationship of the Rules to the preexisting
common law and about the relative weight of text in the interpretation of
the Rules.
C. Eavesdroppers and Privileges
Kentucky's pre-Rules law extended no protection to privileged
communications overheard by eavesdroppers.324 Drafters of the Rules
recommended codification of this preexisting law325 but the proposal was
deleted from the Rules before their enactment,326 leaving them silent on an
important subject and creating another interpretation problem for the
supreme court, one that is quite different from the problem in Stringer and
illustrative of problems where survival of preexisting common law is
unaffected by K.R.E. 402.
It is important to note that Rule 402 operates to abolish only uncodified
rules that are exclusionary in effect. The eavesdropper rule is inclusionary,
not exclusionary, and is thus unaffected by this "keystone" provision of the
Rules, although this fact does not by any means suggest that the preexisting
law survived adoption of the Rules. Evidentiary policy favors the preexist-
31 See Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, § 16, 1990 Ky. Acts 176, 180.31 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, § 30, 1992 Ky. Acts 921, 936.
32 See, e.g., Vanhornv. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1931) (involving
attorney-client communication); Ratcliffe v. Commonwealth, 21 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.
1929) (involving attorney-client communication); Commonwealth v. Everson, 96
S.W. 460 (Ky. 1906) (involving husband-wife communication).31 See Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, § 24, 1990 Ky. Acts 176, 182.326 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, § 30, 1992 Ky. Acts 921,936.
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ing rule,327 which might indicate that a persuasive argument could be made
for viewing the preexisting law as a "source of guidance" in the interpreta-
tion of the privileges provisions. Two considerations work against this
outcome: one specific to the issue, and one with broader and more
important implications for the subject under discussion.
It would be difficult to embrace a preexisting rule without taking into
careful account the rejection of the drafters' proposal by the General
Assembly and supreme court, for this rejection would seem to express
some degree of "legislative intent" to abandon the earlier position. While
Stringer indicates that this consideration is not alone determinative of an
interpretation decision,328 there exists in this instance a more serious
obstacle to an interpretation of the Rules preserving eavesdropper
testimony.
With one exception, 329 the privileges provisions are textually unfiiendly
to eavesdropper testimony, providing privilege holders with a right "to
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing"
protected confidential communications. 330 Although arguments might be
formulated for excepting eavesdroppers from the italicized text of these
provisions,331 it is at least doubtful that the supreme court could be
327 Privileges generally exist to allow free disclosure of information between
parties to protected relationships. They deprive the tribunal of probative evidence
and thus are given no broader application than needed to preserve the protected
relationship. Eavesdroppers are not known to the parties involved in the protected
relationship; admission of their testimony should have no adverse effect on free
disclosure.
31 The situation in Stringer also involved the rejection of a drafters' recom-
mendation. The dissenters used this factor in support of their position but were
unpersuasive with the majority: "If we had wished to adopt a rule of evidence
precluding any expert opinion embracing the ultimate issue, it would have been a
simple matter to have done so when we approved the Rules of Evidence and
submitted them to the legislature in 1991." Stringerv. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d
883, 892 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1374 (1998).
329 K.R.E. 504, which defines the husband-wife privilege, is unlike the other
privilege provisions of the Rules, undoubtedly because of the fact that a substantial
modification of the drafters' recommendation occurred during the course of
enacting the Rules. Compare Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, § 26, 1990 Ky. Acts
183, with Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, § 30, 1992 Ky. Acts 924.330 K.R.E. 503 (attorney-client privilege) (emphasis added); see also id. 505
(religious privilege); id. 506 (counselor-client privilege); id. 507 (psychotherapist-
patient privilege).
33 It can be shown that the italicized text was not aimed at the problem of
eavesdropper testimony, for it was in the package of proposals that included the
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persuaded to disregard both the "plain language" of the Rules and the
"legislative history" that is compatible with that language. In any event,
resolution of the "eavesdropper" problem is likely to reveal a good deal
about the supreme court's view of plain meaning interpretation of the
Rules.
D. Impeachment on Collateral Facts
Kentucky's pre-Rules common law included a prohibition against
impeachment through contradiction on collateral facts.332 It served to keep
litigation within reasonable bounds3 33 while leaving room for legitimate
challenge to the credibility ofwitnesses.334 It was difficult to apply, mostly
because of the obscurity of the term "collateralness, ' 3 but it played an
important if not pivotal role in the pre-Rules litigation process. Never-
theless, it was not adopted as a part of the Rules. Without the benefit of
focused argument on the issue, the supreme court has indicated that the
rejected proposal on eavesdroppers. See STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 38-53.
Moreover, it is clear that the italicized text would be needed for effective privileges
even if eavesdropper testimony is ruled admissible; for example, it would be
needed to empower a client to prevent testimony from an attorney about
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. The text, in otherwords,
would not be totally deprived of meaning if interpreted to permit eavesdropper
testimony.
332 See, e.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 45 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1932), overruled
inpart by Jettv. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Cincinnati, N.O. &
T.P. Ry. Co. v. Prewitt's Adm'r, 262 S.W. 1 (Ky. 1924).
333 Baker Pool Co. v. Bennett, 411 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Ky. 1967) ("[T]he issues
in a cause would be multiplied indefinitely, the real merits of the controversy
would be lost sight of in the mass of testimony to immaterial points.").334 It did this in part by permitting impeachment by contradiction on collateral
facts if it could be accomplished on cross-examination of the witness being
impeached. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1928);
Hayden v. Commonwealth, 131 S.W. 521 (Ky. 1910).
33' The pre-Rules common law did utilize the common definition of collateral-
ness, which asks "[c]ould the fact, as to which the prior self-contradiction is
predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the self
contradiction?" Commonwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky. 1955)
(quoting 3 JOHNHENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMONLAW 692 (3d
ed. 1940)), overruled in part by Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.
1969).
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preexisting law survived adoption of the Rules,336 a position that clearly
appears to be soft enough for reconsideration.
K.R.E. 402 is plainly applicable on its face to the problem under
discussion. The preexisting law in question was exclusionary and had
its effect on evidence that is undeniably relevant. Under the terms of
Rule 402, such evidence is admissible unless its exclusion is required
by either the federal or state constitution, a statute, a court rule, or an
evidence rule. Simply stated, the plain language of the Rule leaves no
room for the survival of the prohibition against impeachment by contradic-
tion on collateral facts, or any other common-law based exclusionary rule
for that matter. It does not, in achieving this fundamental codified
objective, leave the system vulnerable to an endless proliferation of
collateral issues.
One of the sources of exclusionary rules recognized by K.R.E. 402 is
"these rules" (the Evidence Rules). In "these rules," one finds a provision
that defines a much improved approach to dealing with the evil of issue
proliferation. K.R.E. 403 authorizes trial judges, at their discretion, to
exclude relevant evidence having a probative worth that is "substantially
outweighed" by the danger of, among other things, "confusion of the
issues." Under the preexisting law, an objection to evidence of contradic-
tion would have required the trial court to undertake the near-impossible
task of distinguishing collateral and noncollateral facts.337 Under Rule 403,
upon such an objection, the court weighs the probativeness of the evidence
(for impeachment purposes) against the undesirable effect of issue
proliferation, excluding it only if the latter substantially outweighs the
former. Rule 403 is probably less exclusionary than the preexisting
common law rule but should produce more carefully reasoned admissibil-
ity decisions once trial judges grow more accustomed to its use in this
context. It is unlikely, however, that this improved approach will be
3 See Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 858 (Ky. 1997) ("This
evidence was properly excluded for several reasons. First, it was an attempted
impeachment on a collateral fact.").
337 See LAWSON, supra note 6, at 178.
A fact is collateral in this context ifit could not be introduced into evidence
for some purpose absent the contradiction. This is an obscure definition that
has to be applied in an almost endless variety of factual situations....
Determining collateralness under this definition is free of difficulty only in
obvious situations.
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
employed in the trial courts before the supreme court clarifies its position
on the survival or demise of the preexisting rule.338
E. Rehabilitation Before Impeachment
The pre-Rules common law required the exclusion of evidence of
character for truthfulness except when offered to rebut evidence of
character for untrlthfulness, 339 a universally embraced exclusionary rule
grounded in undisputably sound evidentiary policy.340 It was recommended
by drafters of the Rules, in a provision addressing all aspects of character
and credibility,34" ' but was not included in the final version of the Rules. 42
The omission resulted from action on the floor of the General Assembly
that produced the most ambiguous and inadequate rule in the entire set of
Rules,343 leaving gaps in the law on character and credibility, and an
interpretation issue that provides an opportunity to make an important
338 While there is no Kentucky case law supportive of this use of Rule 403, one
can find several cases in which the federal counterpart has been used to address
issues arising from impeachment by contradiction on collateral issues. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 806 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1993); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d
1384, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 873 (11th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1317 (7th Cir. 1976).
31 See, e.g., Shell v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1932); Ellis v. Ellis,
612 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. App. 1981).
340 See LAWSON, supra note 6, at 173 ("Permitting credibility to be bolstered
ahead of attack would waste enormous amounts of time, increase risks of unfair
prejudice, and add unnecessarily to the difficulty and complexity of litigation.").
341 See STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 58.342 The enacted provision on character evidence for credibility purposes, K.R.E.
608, says nothing about the order in which such evidence must be introduced,
unlike the proposal from which it was drawn. See K.R.E. 608. If taken literally, the
enacted provision permits bolstering of character before it is attacked.343 See LAWSON, supra note 6, at 201.
No provision of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence suffered as much
alteration in the enactment process as KRE 608. The enacted rule surfaced
on the floor of the legislature at the last minute and got adopted without any
scrutiny by the drafters of the Rules. The end result is a provision that is
grossly incomplete, inconsistent on its face, and inexplicably at odds with
parallel provisions of the Rules dealing with the substantive use of character
evidence.
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concluding point about the relationship between preexisting common law
doctrine and the Rules.
The preexisting rule under discussion-no bolstering by proof of
character before impeachment-is an exclusionary rule that would perish
under the dictates of K.R.E. 402; character for credibility is relevant and
none of the Rule's listed sources of exclusion closes the doorto admission.
However, if any situations exist in which the command of this "keystone"
should surrender to uncodified rules of exclusion, this one would surely
qualify. The adopted provision on character-K.R.E. 608-is so obscure than
even diehard textualists would concede that courts might be justified in
looking beyond the text of the Rules for a solution to the problem2 4 The
preexisting law was grounded in sound policy, recommended by the
drafters of the Rules, endorsed by the supreme court, but left uncodified as
a result of incompetence and nothing more."5 In other words, one can find
in this situation several good reasons to revive the preexisting rule and to
disregard the command of K.R.E. 402 to admit all relevant evidence not
excluded by a constitution, statute, court rule, or evidence rule. On the
other hand, if so inclined, one can find at least equally good reason for
adhering to the text of this pivotal provision of the Rules.
It goes without saying that the Rules are not set in concrete. Drafters
contemplated that conflicts, inconsistencies, and undesirable results would
surface in the use of the Rules over time and that periodic repair would be
needed. They added to the Rules themselves an amendment process that
accounts for the unique method by which the Rules came into being and
that recognizes the judiciary's special capability to formulate evidence
34 See Imwinkelried, MovingBeyond "Top Down " Grand Theories, supra note
167, at 418.
Embarrassingly, some legislation includes provisions which are
linguistically incoherent. The drafting is poor and sloppy. When a court
realistically concludes that the statute subjudice falls into this category, the
text can hardly command great respect. Unless the court is willing to go to
the extreme of invalidating the legislation due to linguistic incompetence,
the court must fill the gaps left by the statutory text. The legislative default
invites, even forces, the court to engage in policymaking.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" There is no record of how proposed Rule 608 came to be modified and
adopted in its present form. However, there is no indication that anyone or any
group wanted to eliminate the prohibition against bolstering credibility by use of
character before impeachment on that ground.
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rules needed for an efficient, effective adjudicatory system. The key
component of this process is an Evidence Rules Review Commission that
was created to work with the supreme court and General Assembly on
necessary modifications of the Rules.3 6 The Commission is perfectly
positioned to monitor the operation of the Rules, to formulate and initiate
proposals to modify them, to correct problems like the one under discus-
sion in relatively short order, and to reduce the cost of adherence to the
command of K.R.E. 402 to a minimal level.
Unfortunately, if not astonishingly, the amendment provisions of the
Rules have never been activated, although the supreme court retains
absolute control over such activation. The chiefjustice chairs the Commis-
sion, appoints six of its eight members, and holds exclusive authority to
call the Commission into operation. 347 There was no appointment of
members to the Commission for five years after adoption of the Rules341
and there have been no meetings of the Commission to date. As a result,
there has been minimal oversight of the Rules, no substantial review of
their effectiveness, andno consideration ofneededmodifications, although
the need for modification has existed since the moment of adoption.
The General Assembly has no serious interest in evidence rules and no
real capability of dealing with evidence issues even if interested; although
the supreme court is best at dealing with cases and controversies, it has a
history of dealing in the abstract with rules of practice and procedure and
an indisputable ability to deal competently with evidence issues. The
Rules' drafters believed that the court would have serious interest in the
Evidence Rules and that control over the amendment process should rest
with the court. There is hope yet that the court will manifest such interest
and take the necessary actions to prevent an erosion of the substantial
benefits of having a comprehensive code of evidence.
346 See K.R.E. 1102(c) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor the General Assembly
should undertake to amend or add to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence without first
obtaining a review of any proposed amendments or additions from the Evidence
Rules Review Commission described in KRE 1103."); see also K.R.E. 1103
(providing rules for the membership, meetings, and duties of the Evidence Rules
Review Commission).
347 See K.R.E. 1103.
348 See Letter from Robert Stephens, Chief Justice, to Robert G. Lawson (Apr.
3, 1997) (on file with author).
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